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Notwithstanding the political grandstanding and legal regimes put in
place to prevent the next Enron, this article explores whether attorney
whistleblower provisions provided in the Standards of Professional Con-
duct for Attorneys Appearing and Practicing Before the Commission in the
Representation of an Issuer and in the Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct are effective. When faced with attorney involvement in Enron, Con-
gress passed § 307 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act (Sarbanes), which required
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to amend its standards
governing the conduct of attorneys practicing before the SEC. In response,
the SEC and the American Bar Association drafted or amended rules to
remind attorneys that the client is the company, not its agents, and to enable
attorneys to disclose information. The new rules require attorneys to report
suspicious activity up the chain, going as far as the board of directors, if
necessary, and permits attorneys to “blow the whistle” by reporting exter-
nally in some extreme circumstances. These changes were fueled by a belief
that a well-informed, willing, and diligent attorney can act as a gatekeeper,
stopping its clients from committing corporate fraud or, if the client cannot
be stopped, acting as a whistleblower to mitigate harm to the market. Not
only are those provisions ineffective, but the entire premise behind those
regimes is fundamentally flawed because of its failure to understand the
attorney-client relationship, corporate structure, and corporate criminal
wrongdoing. For any and all of these reasons, the idea of an attorney as a
whistleblower is a myth.
Even worse, the failure of Congress to understand corporate and attor-
ney behavior has left the market exposed to extraordinary criminal wrong-
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doing with only after-the-fact investigations, if anything, available to deter.
More importantly, these regimes have left people—you, me, and our fami-
lies—vulnerable to be preyed on in the name of a corporate profit. This is
because at their core, corporate fraud scandals are about deception in con-
junction with the use of tactics and structures that are legal and, at times,
complex. Legal corporate structuring renders the whistleblowing mandate
found in Sarbanes ineffective. Companies still have tools that were essential
to the pre-Sarbanes fraud and market manipulation—namely, the ability to
use business structures and rules defining the attorney-client relationship to
evade detection. This article takes a novel approach of exploring the usage
of legal business structures, the placement of attorneys within those struc-
tures, and the role these activities have in corporate misconduct.
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I. INTRODUCTION
RECENT media stories have noted that in the modern era, busi-nesses are plagued with scandal that has minimal legal conse-quence due to lack of enforcement and lack of criminal and civil
penalties.1 Unlike past eras, tort and criminal liability are not serving as a
check on corporate misconduct. When combined with a lax regulatory
regime and decreasing competition, companies can commit malfeasance
1. See Scandal Suggests Standards Have Slipped in Corporate America, ECONOMIST
(Apr. 6, 2019), https://www.economist.com/business/2019/04/06/scandals-suggest-standards-
have-slipped-in-corporate-america [https://perma.cc/494L-LK2G]. Although these scandals
do not result in trial verdicts, enforcements, or convictions, they are still costly to compa-
nies and have negative impacts on stock prices.
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and continue to thrive.2 Further, a regulatory regime that is centered on
disclosure and reporting inundates the market with information that is
difficult to understand. It allows bad actors to hide in plain sight. Without
crisis and without the market forces of fear of litigation or regulatory
enforcement, the incentives to comply come from shareholders and the
capital markets.3 But when the capital markets and shareholders accept
what they perceive as worthwhile risks for the gains, it is difficult for at-
torneys and other gatekeepers4 to have an impact on management behav-
ior.5 The attorney, regulatory, and law enforcement desires are at odds in
the current corporate climate because the current corporate climate is
light on regulation while the market is heavy on the promotion of a cor-
porate culture focused on innovation and disruption.6 If the ultimate job
of the attorney is to represent the corporation’s interests on behalf of its
shareholders, an attorney whistleblower who desires to follow the letter
of the law in a climate that does not enforce the law does more harm than
good.7
Following the collapse of Enron, which was based primarily upon mar-
ket manipulation utilizing special purpose entities and illegal accounting
practices, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Sarbanes).8 Among
many changes, Sarbanes increased disclosure and reporting requirements
and made changes to accounting rules.9 Congress responded to the Enron
attorney problem in § 307 of Sarbanes,10 a last-minute amendment to the
bill proposed by Senator John Edwards during floor debate.11 It seeks to
acknowledge and provide a remedy to the presence of attorneys at every
2. See Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate Disobedience, 68 DUKE L.J. 709, 712–14 (2019)
(noting the benefits to breaking laws by companies like Uber and the marijuana industry).
3. Id. at 755–56 (highlighting the inadequacy of shareholder litigation and fiduciary
duties to ameliorate corporate misconduct).
4. See Sung Hui Kim, Gatekeepers Inside Out, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 411, 413
(2008) [hereinafter Kim, Gatekeepers Inside Out] (defining gatekeepers as “private in-
termediaries who can prevent harm to the securities markets by disrupting the misconduct
of their client representatives”).
5. See Pollman, supra note 2, at 712–15.
6. See Elizabeth Pollman & Jordan M. Barry, Regulatory Entrepreneurship, 90 S.
CAL. L. REV. 383, 398 (2017) (“Many regulatory entrepreneurs follow the maxim that it is
better to beg forgiveness than to ask for permission. In this context, that means that it is
better to enter markets and start providing services to the public—legally or otherwise—
than to seek approval from regulators. Companies often justify this behavior by construing
some gray area in the law as permitting the action in question. A motivated entrepreneur
can often manufacture a legal gray area, blurring the line between outright lawbreaking
and aggressive interpretation.”). Notably, the examples highlighted by Pollman and Barry
have had their manipulation of grey areas rewarded with continued investment. See, e.g.,
Biz Carson, Uber IPO: Inside the 2008 Pitch That Birthed an $80 Billion Startup, FORBES
(May 10, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bizcarson/2019/05/10/uber-ipo-original-2008-
pitch-deck/#4bc3b6924a57 [https://perma.cc/7WW7-B5G9].
7. See Pollman, supra note 2, at 755.
8. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.).
9. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1) (2018); see also Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley
Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1526–27 (2005).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 7245.
11. 148 CONG. REC. S5,652–53 (daily ed. June 18, 2002) (statement of Sen. Edwards).
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stage of Enron’s fraudulent scheme.12 Sarbanes and the changes made to
accounting standards cover accountants and the action of Arthur Ander-
son extensively,13 but until Edwards’s proposal, the role of attorneys in
the fraud was unaddressed.14
As a result of § 307, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
added a requirement to the Standards of Professional Conduct for Attor-
neys Appearing and Practicing Before the Commission in the Represen-
tation of an Issuer15 (SEC Standards16) that attorneys practicing before
the SEC report evidence of wrongdoing up the ladder within the com-
pany, going as high up as a company’s board of directors and, in extreme
circumstances, externally.17 The American Bar Association (ABA) also
updated the ethical rules for all attorneys.18 In 2003, the ABA House of
Delegates voted to make changes to Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct (Model Rules) 1.6 and 1.13, confirming the status of the corporation
as the client and adapting the SEC’s mandatory up-the-ladder and op-
tional external reporting scheme for all attorneys, not just those repre-
senting issuers before the SEC.19 When another crisis emerged in 2008,
Congress chose to extend its encouragement of whistleblowing in the
Dodd-Frank Act (Dodd-Frank).20 Congress, regulators, and law enforce-
ment appear to hold the belief that if they had more information sooner,
they could prevent fraud on the market. Unfortunately, for shareholders
and the capital markets, this belief is mistaken.
The difficulty, or even impossibility, of an attorney assuming the role of
a whistleblower is evident in the lack of enforcements, post-Enron, for
attorney participation in corporate misconduct.21 Following the changes,
there have been zero SEC actions against attorneys for violations of the
SEC Standards developed under the mandate found in Sarbanes. There
12. Id.; see also STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO SARBANES-
OXLEY 110 (2007); Jennifer M. Pacella, Conflicted Counselors: Retaliation Protections for
Attorney-Whistleblowers in an Inconsistent Regulatory Regime, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 491,
502, 529 (2016).
13. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 12, at 186–222.
14. Id. at 110; Sung Hui Kim, Naked Self-Interest? Why the Legal Profession Resists
Gatekeeping, 63 FLA. L. REV. 129, 131–32 (2011) [hereinafter Kim, Naked Self-Interest?]
(explaining that Sarbanes marks Congress’ formal recognition of the lawyer’s role as a
gatekeeper, but that these efforts were met with aggressive lobbying against the measures
by the bar); see also Corporate Counsel Critique SEC Proposal on Lawyer Reporting Man-
dated by New Law, 18 ABA/BNA LAW. MAN. PROF. CONDUCT 698, 698 (2002) (Sarbanes-
Oxley regulations put “attorneys in the role of judge rather than advocate”).
15. 17 C.F.R § 205.1 (2019).
16. “SEC Standards” refers only to the standards governing lawyers.
17. See 17 C.F.R. § 205.3.
18. See Lawrence A. Hamermesh, The ABA Task Force on Corporate Responsibility
and the 2003 Changes to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETH-
ICS 35, 36–37 (2003).
19. See id. at 35–37; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6, 1.13 (AM.
BAR. ASS’N 2018).
20. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2010).
21. An extensive review of SEC enforcements from 2002 through August 1, 2019, re-
sulted in zero actions against attorneys for failure to report externally under the limited
circumstances found in 1.6 or to report up the chain under Rule 1.13.
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are also no disciplinary proceedings for violation of the applicable provi-
sions of the Model Rules. This result is not only in line with the modern
era of reduced enforcement, but it is also the result of the distorted “pris-
oner’s dilemma”22 that faces an attorney whistleblower and even some
attorneys who attempt to act as gatekeeper. Instead of the traditional,
clear incentive to do the right thing or face punishment, the lack of en-
forcement incentivizes the attorney to do nothing.23
An attorney who cooperates with their client will face penalties under
the ethical rules that predated Sarbanes.24 An attorney acting in the role
of a gatekeeper for SEC reporting, who may be required to certify disclo-
sures, also faces penalties for false representations under preexisting
rules.25 Yet, under the new whistleblower regime, an attorney who is
aware of wrongdoing but fails to report may, at most, be the test case for
enforcement. An attorney who reports may be incorrect in their interpre-
tation of the SEC Standards and the Model Rules, the actions may fall
outside of the requirements for whistleblower protections and rewards,
and the attorney will, most likely, lose the client relationship. Studies also
show that shareholder litigation and enforcement activity have a negative
impact on corporate values, so an attorney who is zealous but mistaken
may actually reduce the shareholder value they sought to protect.26 Mar-
ket forces render it debatable whether an attorney who is being steadfast
about ethics actually serves the corporate good. If the focus is to protect
the assets of the shareholder, a lawyer who finds questionable activity
faces a prisoner’s dilemma with no upside—a situation that is more of a
catch-22 than a dilemma. The silent attorney faces no discipline.27 The
disclosing attorney receives no protection. This is the post-Enron reality.
The regulatory measures taken have not motivated attorneys to change
their behavior in a way that prevents corruption and fraud. There are
factors other than market forces responsible for this failure. The attorney
whistleblower scheme is inconsistent—compliance with the SEC Stan-
dards requires violation of the Model Rules in many circumstances. The
changes were also made with little thought as to their impact on the attor-
ney-client relationship or attorney behavior.28 When these changes were
debated, attorneys in private practice warned that they would not only be
22. See Jim Chappelow, Prisoner’s Dilemma, INVESTOPEDIA (May 23, 2019), https://
www.investopedia.com/terms/p/prisoners-dilemma.asp [https://perma.cc/F5G2-TAGN]
(The prisoner’s dilemma is a concept in game theory “in which two individuals acting in
their own self-interests do not produce the optimal outcome. . . . [B]oth parties choose to
protect themselves at the expense of the other participant” and end up in a worse situation
than if they had cooperated with each other).
23. See Kim, Gatekeepers Inside Out, supra note 4, at 417–18.
24. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 cmt. 7.
25. See id. r. 8.4(c).
26. See Kim, Gatekeepers Inside Out, supra note 4, at 436.
27. See Pacella, supra note 12, at 527.
28. See ROBERT ELI ROSEN, LAWYERS IN CORPORATE DECISION-MAKING 148 n.450
(2010).
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ineffective but could also be harmful to the attorney-client relationship.29
Attorneys, both in-house and at Am Law 100 firms,30 warned that clients
may avoid legal services and expressed concern that it would be difficult
to provide candid advice in a climate in which clients are concerned that
an attorney may report externally. Practitioners felt that the mere possi-
bility would have a chilling effect on the market for legal advice, even
without evidence of a shift to a culture of attorney disclosures.31 The re-
sults appear to prove that these attorneys were correct. To regulators and
legislators, avoiding the impact of fraud on the economy is worth sacrific-
ing long-standing relationships of trust, including the attorney-client rela-
tionship. However, when this sacrifice is attempted without a proper look
at the financial market or the market for legal services, it has no positive
impact. Although noble, the attorney whistleblower cause is futile.
Companies have resolved the Enron attorney problem by holding fast
to the Enron method of corporate governance, with additional instruc-
tions through the whistleblower regime, on how to keep an attorney who
desires to blow the whistle in check. A trusting and reputable board of
directors (board) loyal to management can stop a potential whistleblower
attorney in her tracks, especially in a company led by a dominant chief
executive officer (CEO) perceived to be successful by the board.32 In
companies engaged in high-tech enterprises or companies with compli-
cated structures, a dominant CEO can become the arbiter of information,
preventing attorneys from knowing enough to even justify reporting up
the chain. If the board, responsible for oversight, trusts management, a
disloyal attorney can be fired for reporting to them without management
facing any consequences.33 If shareholders are in support of the corporate
disobedience and believe it is worth the risk to maximize profits and in-
novate, an external report merely contradicts the shareholders’ interests,
ultimately causing harm to the corporation even if it benefits the mission
of regulators.34 Harmful management can silo and embargo information,
rely on complexity, and if financially successful in the short term, con-
29. See Kim, Naked Self-Interest?, supra note 14, at 132–33 (explaining the opposition
of the ABA and attorneys); see also Romano, supra note 9 (noting that the literature sug-
gesting that the proposed mandates would not be effective was ignored by legislators as
they drafted Sarbanes, rendering the quality of the legislation sub-optimal).
30. The American Lawyer publishes an annual list of big law firms, ranking them
based on financial data. See, e.g., Ben Seal, The 2019 Am Law 100: By the Numbers, LAW
.COM (Apr. 23, 2019), https://www.law.com/americanlawyer/2019/04/23/the-2019-am-law-
100-by-the-numbers/ [https://perma.cc/ZKD7-E269].
31. See Kim, Naked Self-Interest?, supra note 14, at 132–33 (explaining the opposition
of the ABA and attorneys).
32. See, e.g., JOHN CARREYROU, BAD BLOOD: SECRETS AND LIES IN A SILICON VAL-
LEY STARTUP 268–80 (2018) (describing how, at Theranos, Elizabeth Holmes had the full
trust of the board, even when they were given negative information from insiders and even
after the company started to fail).
33. See Kabir Ahmed & Dezso Farkas, A Proposal to Encourage Up-the-Ladder Re-
porting by Insulating In-House Corporate Attorneys from Managerial Power, 39 DEL J.
CORP. L. 861, 873–75 (2015).
34. See Pollman, supra note 2, at 750 (“Some corporate lawbreaking may have re-
deeming virtues.”).
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tinue bad behavior until it is too late.35
We know about the behavioral, cultural, and regulatory failures that
led to the collapse of Enron.36 We know about the somewhat draconian
nature of Sarbanes and how it may contribute to the current trend of
high-net-worth, privately held companies, commonly referred to as uni-
corns, as companies have sought to evade the requirements.37 But do we
understand how laws intended to discourage corporate fraud have unin-
tentionally incentivized corporate misconduct at the hands of its profes-
sionally trained representatives? This article takes a novel approach of
exploring the usage of legal business structures, the placement of attor-
neys within those structures, and the role these activities have in corpo-
rate misconduct. Before instituting changes to the attorney-client
relationship, regulators failed to look at real-life lawyers and to analyze
the realities of legal practice. Instead, they imposed an aspirational re-
gime based on an unsubstantiated belief that attorneys desire to assume
the roles of gatekeeper and whistleblower. Because of corporate structur-
ing and the definition of an attorney-client relationship, the whistleblow-
ing mandate found in Sarbanes and the Model Rules is rendered
ineffective. Without measurable rewards for whistleblowing, market
forces discourage attorneys to report, particularly in a regime where there
is no punishment for failure to comply.
In this article, Part II explains the practice of law and the prisoner’s
dilemma imposed on attorneys by the whistleblower regime. Businesses,
particularly those intent on committing fraud, are smart and reactive, and
attorneys are not motivated to contradict client actions. Instead, attor-
neys rely on the operation of law and the Model Rules to silo through
specialization and bury their heads in the sand to avoid unpleasant infor-
mation. Congress has provided smart, potentially criminal, actors with a
blueprint for evading detection while giving attorneys an additional rea-
son to look away.
Part III uses the story of Enron to illustrate how business structure and
corporate governance norms can stop an attorney from whistleblowing or
keep an attorney from having the information required to blow the whis-
tle. Part III also reveals that the interaction of how attorneys practice
with the whistleblower regime does not resolve the Enron attorney prob-
lem; instead, the whistleblower regime provides companies with a
roadmap for avoiding the problem. Market forces and business norms
incentivize attorneys to bury their heads in the sand, take advantage of
35. Sanctions imposed and regulatory changes made ex post do not adequately com-
pensate the parties harmed by market manipulation. See, e.g., CARREYROU, supra note 32,
at 267–80 (highlighting that corporate lawbreaking often continues during the regulatory
review process).
36. See, e.g., Romano, supra note 9, at 1523.
37. See, e.g., Kate Livak, Defensive Management: Does the Sarbanes-Oxley Act Dis-
courage Corporate Risk-Taking?, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1663, 1665 nn.4–11, 1673 (2014)
(summarizing the literature critical of Sarbanes and noting the private company trend).
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silos and information embargoes, and generally avoid assuming the role
of gatekeeper or whistleblower.
In Part IV, the results of deputizing attorney whistleblowers are dis-
cussed, using the modern examples of Theranos and Tesla to explain why
attorney whistleblowers are a myth. After more than fifteen years, zero
enforcements, and zero disciplinary actions against attorneys, it is clear
that other measures are needed to minimize attorney participation in cor-
porate fraud. Eliminating corporate fraud requires cultural change, which
is not accomplished by merely deputizing attorneys as whistleblowers.
II. THE PRACTICE OF LAW: HEAD IN THE SAND AND SILOS
Regulators, investigators, and Congress discussed the presence of
counsel at various stages of Enron’s fraudulent scheme during the devel-
opment of Sarbanes.38 Congress noted that attorneys prepared the forma-
tion documents, gave advice on whether activities were legal, and in some
circumstances made suggestions that may have prolonged the scheme.39
The preexisting standards, which penalized attorneys for participating in
a client’s crimes or frauds, were not triggered by the attorney conduct at
Enron.40 The attorney conduct also failed to trigger the securities regula-
tions governing gatekeepers.41 Attorneys who were not coconspirators
were included but eventually dismissed from the resulting litigation and
were not subjected to disciplinary action from state bar associations or
the SEC. Congress struggled with the idea that an attorney could be pre-
sent yet also be a nonparticipant in such an all-consuming governance
failure. That outcome fit within the norms of the attorney-client relation-
ship, as defined by state rules and common law principles, so the federal
solution is disconnected and ineffective.
This part explains the basics of legal practice, which, in many ways,
leave attorneys siloed, unable to get a full picture of the operations of a
client’s business. When the new whistleblower framework combines with
the siloed practice of law, it never encourages disclosure. Instead, an at-
torney is best served by avoiding information—burying their head in the
proverbial sand.
A. PRACTICING LAW IN THE SILOS
Enron, WorldCom, and other corporations were able to commit fraud
in plain sight, with the assistance of expert and reputational in-
38. See Romano, supra note 9, at 1523–29; see also BAINBRIDGE, supra note 12, at 32.
39. See Final Report of Neal Batson, Court-Appointed Examiner at 48–55, In re En-
ron Corp., 370 B.R. 583 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007) (No. 01-16034) [hereinafter Final Batson
Report].
40. See Appendix C (Role of Enron’s Attorneys) to Final Report of Neal Batson,
Court-Appointed Examiner at 179, 187, 190, In re Enron Corp., 370 B.R. 583 (No. 01-
16034) [hereinafter Appendix C to Final Batson Report].
41. Id.
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termediaries42—namely lawyers and accountants—who, because of ex-
pertise and access, were found to either be complicit or willfully ignorant
of their client’s behavior.43 Accountants and lawyers were present at
nearly every stage of the fraud.44 Lawyers prepared formation documents
and regulatory reports and served as advisors on legal compliance.45 Ac-
countants prepared the financial statements and audits, signing off on the
documents containing the material misstatements that allowed Enron and
others to carry out their schemes longer.46 At the time of the scandal,
securities regulations and state ethical codes had long established legal
duties for attorneys and accountants that required them to be more than
just corporate facilitators.47 In some circumstances, the experts were re-
quired to act as gatekeepers,48 and in others, attorneys and accountants
could be subject to personal criminal and civil liability for joining in their
client’s activities.49 Yet, the preexisting structures regulating attorneys
and accountants failed to stop Enron or to motivate the experts to contra-
dict Enron’s periodic reports and public statements,50 just as other laws
failed to expose the corruption before it was too late.51
Business laws and ethical rules have always defined the client as the
company—not the agents of the company. The law has also prohibited
attorneys from acting as coconspirators with clients or agents of the cli-
ents.52 For these reasons, on the surface, measures which go slightly fur-
ther—making these roles clearer while also mandating a scheme for
attorney internal and external reporting—seem to be just more of the
42. See Christine Hurt, Counselor, Gatekeeper, Shareholder, Thief: Why Attorneys
Who Invest in Their Clients in a Post-Enron World Are Selling Out, Not Buying In, 64
OHIO ST. L.J. 897, 927–28 (2003) (Attorneys and accountants have the ability as indepen-
dent third parties to make parties more comfortable and confident when doing business
with strangers. This is based in part on the reputation of the law firm or accounting firm,
and the belief that they would not risk that reputation by cheating for a client).
43. See Final Batson Report, supra note 39, at 48–55.
44. Id.
45. See Appendix C to Final Batson Report, supra note 40, at 6–14.
46. See Final Batson Report, supra note 39, at 108–13.
47. See, e.g., Larry Cata´ Backer, The Duty to Monitor: Emerging Obligations of
Outside Lawyers and Auditors to Detect and Report Corporate Wrongdoing beyond the
Federal Securities Laws, 77 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 919, 968–69 (2003); James A. Gardner, The
Crime or Fraud Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege, 47 A.B.A. J. 708, 711 (1961);
Leon Green, The Duty to Give Accurate Information, 12 UCLA L. REV. 464, 468–69
(1965).
48. See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, PRINCIPLES OF SECURITIES REGULATION 223 (2006)
(citing In re Carter & Johnson, Exchange Act Release No. 34-17597, 22 SEC Docket 292
(Feb. 28, 1981)). Hazen explains that the SEC has held the view that lawyers should be
held accountable for failing to prevent their clients for failing to comply with the securities
laws’ disclosure requirements. See also John C. Coffee, Jr., The Attorney as Gatekeeper: An
Agenda for the SEC, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1293, 1296–97 (2003) (providing an example and
explanations of gatekeepers).
49. See Coffee, supra note 48, at 1314.
50. See Appendix C to Final Batson Report, supra note 40, at 179, 187.
51. See Rebecca Smith & John R. Emshwiller, ‘24 Days’: Behind Enron’s Demise,
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 8, 2003), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB106029336126554600 [https://
perma.cc/B74Y-7N5U].
52. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
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same.53 The attorney-client relationship is, however, a delicate relation-
ship of trust and confidence that turns on the informed judgment of the
attorney, as it is formulated using the secrets of the client.54 Quality legal
advice cannot be produced in an informational vacuum. So, when the law
is changed in a way that has a chilling effect on the free exchange be-
tween attorney and client, the impact, though difficult to measure, is real.
When Congress reacted to the presence of attorneys at every stage of
the Enron scheme, it failed to acknowledge the delicate balance of the
attorney-client relationship and the norms of the practice of law. These
norms strike a balance between blind and unchecked loyalty to a client
through zealous representation and adhering to a higher code of ethics
that recognizes the special role of attorneys.55 State ethical rules and
common law maintained its balance until Congress intervened post-En-
ron. These changes, made without acknowledgment of the attorney role,
have made the regulation of attorneys more complicated but not better.
This section explains the attorney’s role in society.
1. The Position of Attorneys in Society
Attorneys hold a special role in society. Lawyers serve as advocates for
clients but are also viewed as gatekeepers of justice.56 The attorney-client
relationship is prioritized because we have decided as a society that it is
important to provide clients with unbiased and zealous representation.57
As a result, many feel there is no violation greater than breaking confi-
dentiality or privilege, even if doing so might prevent harm to another.58
It is more important to protect this relationship than to learn about actual
misconduct or attorney speculation about their client’s businesses or be-
haviors. An attorney must keep a client’s secrets in all but a few very
limited circumstances.59
An attorney’s role is to steer the client towards outcomes that meet the
client’s goals without crossing the line ethically or breaking the law.60 At-
torneys serve as their clients’ advocates and trusted advisors, but one can-
not advocate or advise in an informational vacuum.61 To serve clients
53. See, e.g., Romano, supra note 9.
54. See Coffee, supra note 48, at 1302.
55. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl., paras. 1–5.
56. See Larry E. Ribstein, The Death of Big Law, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 749, 767–68
(2010) [hereinafter Ribstein, The Death of Big Law]; see also Coffee, supra note 48, at
1303–07; David E. Rovella, Going from Bad to Worse; Defense Bar Fears Jail Over Tainted
Fees, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 11, 2002, at A9 (quoting practitioners who argue that efforts “to
make lawyers ‘gatekeepers’ of the financial system may further impede the ability of crimi-
nal defense lawyers to properly represent their clients”); Howard Stock, S-O’s Lawyer
Rule May Chill Information Flow, INVESTOR REL. BUS., Aug. 18, 2003 (quoting Professor
Jill Fisch: “There are plenty of watchdogs already in place, and lawyers are poorly posi-
tioned to be gatekeepers.”).
57. See Hamermesh, supra note 18, at 46.
58. Id. at 48.
59. See also Coffee, supra note 48, at 1307–10. See generally FED. R. EVID. 501;
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6.
60. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(d), 1.6.
61. See, e.g., Hamermesh, supra note 18, at 48–50.
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best, attorneys and clients need an honest exchange of all relevant infor-
mation.62 To facilitate this open exchange, the law shields the attorney-
client relationship with privilege and confidentiality that prohibits an at-
torney from disclosing client communications in all but a few exceptional
circumstances.63 The belief is that this protection enables clients to trust
their lawyers, which enables lawyers to represent clients effectively,
which then improves the administration of justice, improves business re-
lationships, and helps to protect the market.64
On the other hand, law enforcement and regulators work to prevent
crime or fraud, not simply to punish it. Early access to information en-
ables law enforcement to stop a crime before it happens and allows regu-
lators to adopt a regime that more accurately reflects reality. The
information required by regulatory disclosures, however, will not show
the entire picture when parties are intentionally engaging in fraud to ma-
nipulate the market.65 Yet, in the hindsight following a corporate scandal
or market collapse, there is always the belief that if we only had all the
information held by a company’s insiders and experts, including the infor-
mation protected by confidentiality and privilege, regulators could put
the pieces together and prevent the harm to the market.66
The primary source of rules governing attorneys is the Model Rules,
promulgated by the ABA. These rules, when adopted, apply to all attor-
neys practicing within a jurisdiction. The sanctity of the relationship of
trust and confidence between attorney and client is the cornerstone of the
Model Rules and of the privilege rules found in the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence.67 Under Model Rule 1.6, an attorney must not reveal information
related to the representation of a client without that client’s informed
consent.68 The Federal Rules of Evidence give the client the right to re-
fuse to disclose and to prevent the disclosure of confidential communica-
tions between attorney and client.69 This attorney-client privilege is one
of the oldest and most recognized privileges.70 The goal of the attorney-
client privilege and Rule 1.6 is to encourage full and frank discussions
amongst attorneys and clients.71 In fact, attorneys have been subject to
discipline for improperly revealing confidential client information even
when doing so for noble reasons.
The information necessary to competently complete engagement is in
62. Coffee, supra note 48, at 1307.
63. See FED. R. EVID. 501; MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6.
64. Coffee, supra note 48, at 1307–08.
65. See infra Part III.A.
66. See generally, e.g., FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY RE-
PORT (2011), http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-reports/fcic_final_report_
full.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q2KT-SKD6].
67. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl., para. 2.
68. Id. r. 1.6 cmt. 2; see also Coffee, supra note 48, at 1307–10.
69. See FED. R. EVID. 501.
70. See id.
71. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 cmt. 2.
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an attorney’s discretion.72 Similarly, whether the actions of the client or
its agents are reasonably likely to result in harm to the company itself, the
shareholders, or the market is also within the attorney’s judgment.73 An
attorney must balance the duty to not over-bill or be inefficient in investi-
gation through researching outside of the representation and what is nec-
essary for the representation, with the duty to obtain any information
required to comply with a regulatory scheme. It is the client, not the gov-
ernment, who retains the attorney. As a result, when acting as a gate-
keeper of justice, the attorney’s job is to defend the client and advocate
on their behalf, not to preserve the integrity of a regulatory regime.
When an attorney represents a company, they interact with manage-
ment and employees but represent the entity not its agents.74 This rela-
tionship is further complicated when a company is comprised of
numerous companies with separate management and multiple lawyers.75
The business structure and management logistics determine whether the
various entities are treated as truly separate under the law.76 Notably, this
is often a legal decision made with the advice of counsel. Attorneys struc-
ture these entities based on legal realities and business desires, not on the
impact to the market. Attorneys do not make moral decisions when struc-
turing entities for clients. Yet, these decisions determine the location of
the top-of-the-chain and who to consider as a constituent when deciding
financial harm for purposes of the whistleblower regime.
In all attorney-client relationships, the closeness between attorneys and
the agents of corporate clients makes them susceptible to capture.77
While attorneys know that they represent the corporation and not its
management and employees, they must work closely with the company’s
agents to maintain the relationship. A successful attorney is a friend of
the client, serving a special purpose in a time of need, and that friendship
cannot be forged with a fictitious entity that is only a person on paper.
Instead, human nature trends toward the attorney forming a friendship
with the general counsel (GC), CEO, or other employee contact, and that
friendship may cause an attorney to investigate less and trust the agent’s
word more often than they should.78 Sarbanes attempts to address this
72. See id. cmt. 5.
73. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(2) (2019).
74. See Ribstein, The Death of Big Law, supra note 56; see also Larry E. Ribstein,
Delawyering the Corporation, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 305, 324–28 (2012) [hereinafter Ribstein,
Delawyering the Corporation].
75. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13 cmt. 1–2.
76. See infra note 77.
77. Regulatory capture is a form of government failure which occurs when a regula-
tory agency, created to act in the public interest, instead advances the commercial or politi-
cal concerns of special interest groups that dominate the industry or sector it is charged
with regulating. When regulatory capture occurs, the interests of firms, organizations, or
political groups are prioritized over the interests of the public, leading to a net loss for
society. When attorneys are captured, they work in the interest of their clients, not to
promote the greater social good. See Kim, Gatekeepers Inside Out, supra note 4, at 413.
78. See ROSEN, supra note 28, at 46 (noting the prevalence of personal relationships
between lawyers and clients).
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issue, as do the changes to the Model Rules, but the whistleblower regime
does so without any adjustment to the remaining Model Rules that pro-
motes some degree of capture.79 This creates confusion and an inherent
conflict for an attorney who seeks to defer properly to the judgment of a
client or the client’s representative, while also engaging in some degree of
investigation into the actions of the client’s representatives to ensure that
they are not doing the client harm.
2. How Attorneys Practice
Attorneys can wear many hats in corporate practice. They can hold
hybrid positions that combine legal representation with external obliga-
tions, like compliance officers, or they may hold roles that do not require
the practice of law.80 These roles may provide an attorney with a separate
obligation and adequate knowledge to serve as a gatekeeper or to report
externally as a whistleblower.81 In-house attorneys have always served as
both employee and attorney, creating a competing obligation to adhere to
the Model Rules and to be aware of scenarios in which they may be obli-
gated to report externally under SEC regulations or other laws.82 Attor-
neys engaged in quasi-legal or nonlegal roles within a corporation have
the duties of any employee or officer, but the company is not afforded
attorney-client privilege and confidentiality merely because the attorney
has attended law school or is licensed to practice law. Thus, Sarbanes
impacted these in-house attorneys practicing law similar to how other
company employees were impacted.83
For outside counsel, the realities of the practice of law combined with
the structures of business entities encourage attorneys to limit their inves-
tigation of clients to what is necessary for a particular representation.84
This is because every aspect of the attorney-client relationship, from en-
gagement letters and conflicts of interest checks at the outset to determi-
nations about privilege and confidentiality during representation to the
determination of future conflicts with third parties and ongoing duties
after termination of an attorney-client relationship, is based on an accu-
rate determination of client and matter.85 Ethical and evidentiary rules
require that attorneys either clearly delineate and separate clients and
matters or face future conflicts determinations that may hinder business.
Thus, if an attorney is hired to only give tax advice, to provide regulatory
advice on compliance with a statute, or to handle a single trial, the client-
79. See Kim, Gatekeepers Inside Out, supra note 4, at 413–18.
80. See Ribstein, Delawyering the Corporation, supra note 74, at 306–07.
81. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 12, at 32, 110; see also Coffee, supra note 48, at
1298–99.
82. See HAZEN, supra note 48, at 200–01.
83. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 12, at 31–32 (explaining the requirements in Sarbanes
on CEOs and CFOs).
84. See, e.g., Carliss N. Chatman, The Corporate Personhood Two-Step, 18 NEV. L.J.
811, 816 (2018) (explaining that each business entity is a separate legal person).
85. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7, 1.8, 1.9 (AM. BAR ASS’N
2018).
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matter system requires that attorney to tailor the representation.86 An
outside attorney will not have the general knowledge of a client’s busi-
ness operations that in-house counsel may obtain through their
employment.
In addition, the nature of the practice encourages specialization that
will limit an attorney’s ability to see the full picture when analyzing a
client’s business.87 That specialization, when combined with requirements
to remain competent and to bill fairly, promotes siloing of information as
opposed to open and broad investigation. Within a law firm, attorneys
often specialize, either within sections of a large firm or into stand-alone
boutique law firms, to command the highest rates for services.88 The mar-
ket for legal services is also highly competitive, so attorneys must demon-
strate expertise and efficiency to obtain the best clients.89 Clients do not
want an attorney who is a generalist with the intent of diving into every
aspect of the client’s business.90 Instead, outside counsel is retained to
handle a matter or series of matters based on their specialty or to serve as
experts filling in the gaps in expertise held by the in-house legal
department.91
Further, the internal structure of law firms and legal practice imposes
additional restrictions on information reaching the top of the chain within
a client’s company.92 There are often layers of authority at the firm be-
tween those in power with a client and the attorneys doing the work day-
to-day. The associates and junior partners receive instructions from and
often have an obligation to report to a more senior partner or a partner
who is in charge of the relationship with the client.93 In many firms, attor-
neys are expected to first report issues internally to a partner and defer to
or allow the partner to proceed with the client if that partner believes it is
necessary. Most large firms also have a GC’s office of their own where
concerns should be reported before going to the client or others outside
of the firm. The Model Rules insulate this hierarchy through rules that
allow attorneys to defer to the judgment and authority of more senior,
superior attorneys.94 Reporting outside of the law firm to the powers-
that-be at the client company may be a career-ending move that is unpro-
tected by the ethical rules and has yet to receive any substantial protec-
tion in the courts.
In-house attorneys engaged exclusively in the practice of law can either
86. See id. r. 1.2.
87. See ROSEN, supra note 28, at 5–6; Ribstein, Delawyering the Corporation, supra
note 74, at 308–09; see also Ribstein, The Death of Big Law, supra note 56, at 753–55.
88. See Ribstein, The Death of Big Law, supra note 56, at 755–56.
89. Id. at 757–60.
90. Id. at 759–60.
91. Id. at 756–58.
92. See ROSEN, supra note 28, at 19–21.
93. See Ribstein, The Death of Big Law, supra note 56, at 757 (noting that firms often
have “rainmaking” partners primarily responsible for client relationships).
94. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.1, 5.2, 5.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
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serve as generalists or specialists.95 Some in-house legal departments
closely mimic law firm structures, with attorneys assigned directly to a
specialized group or a single subsidiary within a corporate family.96 For
the attorneys who are specializing in-house, the same influences of siloing
and the client-matter system apply. An attorney who serves as GC or who
is employed to be a jack-of-all-trades generalist may have substantially
more information about the operations of the company’s business. But a
generalist in-house attorney may also lack detailed information about op-
erations or they may lack the subject matter expertise necessary to under-
stand anything beyond purely legal matters. The in-house generalist will
not be siloed but will know only the facts relevant to legal representation.
The generalist can rely on the requirements for competence to bury their
head in the sand, focusing only on assigned tasks and the information
necessary to provide the advice sought.97 Even in-house, competent rep-
resentation does not require investigation into decisions that are purely
based in business judgment if the attorney’s only job is to serve as a
lawyer.98
3. The Attorney’s Role in Client Wrongdoing
By the very nature of attorney representation, when fraud happens, the
lawyers often know something. An attorney may have suspicions and may
be counseling clients to avoid activities constituting crime or a fraud, but
unless the client uses the attorney’s services to engage in crime or fraud,
the attorney is prohibited from disclosing the information.99 Under the
preexisting standards, when communications between attorney and client
are used to further a crime, fraud, or tort, the crime-fraud exception ren-
ders the privilege moot—but only if the action is carried out.100 Mere
speculation does not allow disclosure; instead, an attorney must have a
reasonable belief.101
Even under the new whistleblower regime, attorney determinations
must be based in facts obtained from the attorney’s representation of the
client.102 An attorney is not permitted to report externally because they
simply disagree with governance; an attorney needs evidence, gained
from representation or at least related to representation, that wrongdoing
will result in substantial harm to the company, its shareholders, or the
market.103 The Model Rules, however, exclude lawyers from the decision-
95. See ROSEN, supra note 28, at 5; Kim, Gatekeepers Inside Out, supra note 4, at
455–57.
96. See Ribstein, The Death of Big Law, supra note 56, at 760, 798.
97. See Kim, Gatekeepers Inside Out, supra note 4, at 418 (“A gatekeeper who poten-
tially faces the hard decision of either losing one’s job . . . or losing one’s professional
license . . . will prefer to cloister herself within her office and hear no evil.”).
98. See Ribstein, The Death of Big Law, supra note 56, at 798.
99. See generally FED. R. EVID. 501; MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6.
100. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(2).
101. Id.
102. See 17 C.F.R. § 205.3 (2019).
103. Id.
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making process, place them in the role of counselor and advocate, and
then reinsert them in the process as deputized regulators and corporate
monitors.104 The whistleblower regime coexists with the Model Rules that
allow a lawyer to bury their head in the sand and focus only on what they
are retained to address. Yet, the whistleblower regime expects lawyers to
be observant of hierarchical violations, reporting externally only when
they have knowledge they cannot possibly have if they act efficiently and
competently pursuant to other Model Rules.105
No regulatory system is perfect, and it is an improper conclusion that
the Model Rules and securities regulations in place for lawyers at the
time of Enron were flawed because Enron’s attorneys failed to detect and
mitigate the fraud.106 Attorneys and accountants, although both experts,
operate under different standards due to their roles in society. Account-
ants prepare reports that provide an accurate snapshot of a company’s
financial performance.107 They are held personally liable for audits and
other reports they certify, and they make statements that their represen-
tations to the public are accurate and that they have reviewed all relevant
and material information.108 An accountant is not only an expert serving
a company but also an intermediary who protects the public by ensuring
that an accurate account of a company’s financials is available.109 Al-
though one would anticipate that adding gatekeeping and whistleblowing
would be more plausible and nondisruptive because it is in line with other
aspects of an accountant’s role, Sarbanes and the creation of the Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board have created major changes to
accountant liability.110 Accountants have faced increased liability, yet at-
torneys have managed to avoid any enforcement as a result of Sarbanes.
The reason for this lack of attorney enforcement is that the role of an
attorney is different. As an advocate of the client, there is no requirement
to investigate fully or to represent absolute truth to the public.111 Instead,
competency, which includes a duty not to excessively bill a client or over-
investigate, requires an attorney to use their best professional judgment
to determine what information is necessary to give the services a client
104. See ROSEN, supra note 28, at 149.
105. See id.
106. The Final Batson Report does not blame attorneys; it notes they may have com-
mitted malpractice but does not allege participation in criminal activities. See Final Batson
Report, supra note 39, at 114–17.
107. See HAZEN, supra note 48, at 188–89 (accountants act as certifiers of financial
statements and thus are specifically subject to independent requirements).
108. See Final Batson Report, supra note 39, at 39–47.
109. See HAZEN, supra note 48, at 188–89 (accountants act as certifiers of financial
statements and thus are specifically subject to independent requirements).
110. See id.; see also A.C. Pritchard, The Irrational Auditor and Irrational Liability, 10
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 19, 33 (2006).
111. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(d), 1.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018); see
also Larry E. Ribstein, Ethical Rules, Agency Costs, and Law Firm Structure, 84 VA. L.
REV. 1707, 1714–15 (1998) (highlighting importance of loyalty to clients). Rule 1.2(d) pro-
hibits attorneys from counseling clients to commit crimes/frauds but does not require attor-
neys to investigate and prevent crimes.
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needs while avoiding blatant misrepresentations to the public.112 Candor
requires that an attorney not knowingly make false statements and to
correct any false statements made, but candor does not impose a duty on
an attorney to investigate to verify that representations made on a client’s
behalf are absolutely true.113 The information necessary to competently
complete engagement is in an attorney’s discretion.114 Lawyers are ex-
perts at the practice of law with only knowledge of other business matters
needed to competently represent the client.
In most scenarios, attorneys are not privy to all business information,
nor do they have the requisite expertise to understand it.115 Attorney ad-
vice is only as good as what the attorney knows, and attorney suspicions
about wrongdoing are only as definite as their business knowledge. For
these reasons, the presence of attorneys, and even their involvement in
transactions, does not guarantee that the attorneys are seeing the whole
picture in a way that enables them to simultaneously act as counsel while
doing the work of regulators and law enforcement.116 It may simply indi-
cate that an attorney did not ask enough questions to serve as an investi-
gator, while still obtaining all material information necessary to provide
competent services. The legal practice does not have bright-line rules re-
garding what information is relevant or material like those found in ac-
counting. Attorneys cannot counsel clients to commit crime or fraud, or
encourage them to commit perjury, but attorneys are under no obligation
to investigate beyond the scope of representation to unearth crimes.117
Even when attorneys are giving optimal advice, they cannot force cli-
ents to follow that advice. This is because the future is unknown. So, what
an attorney provides a client is an informed opinion based on the laws as
they exist at a given point in time, in a specific jurisdiction, and as they
apply to the facts the client provides. Attorneys cannot stop clients from
taking that opinion and using it to find an end-run around the operation
of the law. Unfortunately, the impact of a failure to follow legal advice is
quite subjective and the results are purely speculative given the average
attorney’s limited knowledge of the client’s overall business and day-to-
112. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1, 1.5.
113. Id. r. 3.3 cmt. 2 (“A lawyer acting as an advocate in an adjudicative proceeding has
an obligation to present the client’s case with persuasive force. Performance of that duty
while maintaining confidences of the client, however, is qualified by the advocate’s duty of
candor to the tribunal. Consequently, although a lawyer in an adversary proceeding is not
required to present an impartial exposition of the law or to vouch for the evidence submit-
ted in a cause, the lawyer must not allow the tribunal to be misled by false statements of
law or fact or evidence that the lawyer knows to be false.”); id. cmt. 8 (“The prohibition
against offering false evidence only applies if the lawyer knows that the evidence is false. A
lawyer’s reasonable belief that evidence is false does not preclude its presentation to the
trier of fact. A lawyer’s knowledge that evidence is false, however, can be inferred from the
circumstances.”).
114. See id. r. 1.3 cmt. 1.
115. See ROSEN, supra note 28, at 15, 18.
116. Id. at 18, 20.
117. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(d).
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day activities.118 Clients are autonomous entities, balancing attorney
opinions with business goals and the advice of other experts. An attor-
ney’s gatekeeping and whistleblowing roles are not triggered simply be-
cause a client takes an alternative approach.119 At times, the optimal
legal decision is not the optimal business decision, so a client chooses to
follow a good enough opinion that promotes business goals. It is possible
for such a decision to be legally suboptimal without crossing the line to
illegal activity, and it is often only the benefit of hindsight that reveals a
legal misstep.
When combined with the trend towards attorney specialization, these
factors make it virtually impossible to develop a viable solution to corpo-
rate fraud that incorporates information held by attorneys.120 The preex-
isting system acknowledged these realities. The crime-fraud exception,
confidentiality, and gatekeeper rules struck a proper balance, discourag-
ing attorneys from participating while protecting the attorney-client rela-
tionship. These rules acknowledged that when regulating the practice of
law, attorneys should be required to issue opinions that do not counsel
clients to break the law, and these rules encouraged attorneys to with-
draw from representation or disclose if their services are used for crime
or fraud. Whistleblowing and gatekeeping regimes fail because they ex-
pect attorneys to be forward-looking and accurate without the benefit of
hindsight in a justice system that requires attorneys to provide defenses
for past behavior, while offering opinions that mitigate liability in the
present.
B. THE WHISTLEBLOWER REGIME PRISONER’S DILEMMA
While regulators desire to be forward-looking, the justice system is fo-
cused on past and concurrent behavior. Compliance emphasizes best
practices, but criminal prosecution and regulatory enforcement empha-
size punishment and deterrence. The system does not punish parties for
what they might do or what they are considering, and it also does not
punish parties for bad outcomes. Parties are punished for action, inaction,
or attempted action. In this action and intent-based justice system, attor-
neys straddle the line by giving forward-looking advice to avoid violating
the law and placing the client in the best position legally and then provid-
ing investigation and defense services when a client faces enforcement or
prosecution.121 The fact and intent-based system prohibits attorneys from
issuing proclamations. Instead, what an attorney provides is an opinion
118. SEC counsels against reporting subjective information; rather, disclosures should
be based on objective information. Comments to the Model Rules do the same. See, e.g.,
id. r. 1.6 cmt. 7.
119. Id. r. 1.2 cmt. 9. Notably, this also does not trigger director and officer liability. See
infra Part III.C.
120. See, e.g., Richard R. Carlson, Citizen Employees, 70 LA. L. REV. 237, 240 (2009)
(whistleblowers serve the public despite the demands of their employment and face many
obstacles in the workplace).
121. See, e.g., Ribstein, The Death of Big Law, supra note 56, at 761–63 (highlighting
lawyers’ roles of advice-giving and “mobilizing” when issues arise).
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that is limited by the quality of ever-changing inputs. The practice of law
is more art than science.
The whistleblower regime creates a series of prisoner’s dilemmas on
the market for legal services. For consumers of legal services, they face a
choice of seeking attorney advice whenever necessary, being completely
open and candid, or avoiding attorneys unless absolutely necessary. If
prospective clients are open with their attorneys, they risk having counsel
that will challenge business decisions, disrupt business operations with in-
quiry and internal reporting, and potentially report externally, in pursuit
of their role as a whistleblower. If clients are less than forthcoming with
attorneys, or avoid attorneys completely, they risk violating the law and
operating in a way that could subject them to future liability. It is debata-
ble which choice is the less favorable decision in a climate that is cur-
rently lax on enforcement and that has limited the impact of many
common law forces that serve as a check on business behavior.
The practice norms are currently at play in an environment that re-
quires law firms to justify their utility and existence to survive. In re-
sponse to articles that bring the reduction in enforcement to the attention
of the general public, law firms are publishing content to reassure clients
that they are necessary. The market for corporate legal services still ex-
ists, but in a world where Facebook can mishandle user personal informa-
tion with de minimis penalties,122 Elon Musk can violate securities
regulations with minimal consequences,123 and a company like Theranos
can defraud both investors and patients and still receive disproportion-
ately low penalties,124 it is difficult to justify why spending millions on
legal fees to avoid the nonexistent consequences is worth it. For a com-
pany the size of Facebook, a five billion dollar fine as punishment for a
decade of playing fast and loose with client data while flaunting Federal
Trade Commission rules is not worth the cost of avoidance—not when it
continues to generate profits year-over-year at 28%.125 The rational actor
would take their chances, and their shareholders may encourage the
risk.126 These are, after all, business decisions made in a market that is
trending toward the promotion of companies that disobey.127
122. See generally Stipulated Order for Civil Penalties, Monetary Judgment, and Injunc-
tive Relief, United States v. Facebook, Inc., No. 19-cv-2184 (D.D.C. July 24, 2019).
123. See Sean O’Kane, Court Approves Elon Musk’s Securities Fraud Settlement with
the SEC, VERGE (Oct. 16, 2018), https://www.theverge.com/2018/10/16/17983032/elon-
musk-sec-securities-fraud-settlement [https://perma.cc/8N8D-3AYV].
124. See Pete Schroeder, Theranos and Its Founder Settle U.S. Fraud Charges: SEC,
REUTERS (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-theranos-sec/theranos-and-
its-founder-settle-u-s-fraud-charges-sec-idUSKCN1GQ2HC [https://perma.cc/ALW2-
ZY5M]. Note, there are still other claims pending against Theranos founder Elizabeth
Holmes.
125. See Theo Francis, For Facebook and Alphabet, Big-Ticket Fines Cause Limited
Pain, WALL ST. J. (July 30, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/for-facebook-and-alphabet-
big-ticket-fines-cause-limited-pain-11564498156?mod=searchresults&page=1&pos=15
[https://perma.cc/3ALP-V2TA].
126. See Pollman, supra note 2, at 755–56.
127. Id. at 712–15.
688 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72
As a result of the client incentives, the prisoner’s dilemma that moti-
vates the whistleblower regime loses the incentive necessary to make it
effective. Why should clients hire lawyers, who could say no to their ideas
and stop the flow of market disruption and creativity, when no one else is
following the rules? A company like Wells Fargo can clean up their act
later. Or a company like Uber can take advantage of the environment
and then become compliant when they are ready to go public, hiring the
best and brightest for the initial public offering stage while being a pio-
neer for market disruption when operating in the more forgiving and less
regulated private equity space. Why conform when the most successful
businesses do not? Lawyers are attempting to justify their existence in a
market that does not think they are necessary, while saddled with a
whistleblower regime that seeks to prevent capture by deputizing attor-
neys to act as gatekeepers and whistleblowers on their clients. But, in
many ways, what clients pay for is capture. Clients pay for candid advice
based on the sharing of information that could be illegal or otherwise
harmful to the company. A free exchange of information is necessary for
this system to work, which is why the previous rules struck a balance. The
attorney must be loyal but cannot participate in a client’s crimes or
frauds, and the lawyer must remember that it is the company, not its
agents, who pays the bills.128
Under the new regime, lawyers are faced with the options of complying
fully with the rules, betraying their client, and possibly causing personal
economic harm; or with remaining silent and facing disciplinary and regu-
latory action. The reward for silence is maintenance of the attorney-client
relationship, and the punishment is a theoretical harm. In the face of an
environment with zero enforcements and zero reported disciplinary ac-
tions in fifteen years, the rational choice is simple. Attorneys may rely on
the norms of legal practice, which favor specialization, by being conscien-
tious of costs to clients and focusing on only the tasks at hand, only ac-
cepting matters in which they can provide competent representation,
burying their heads in the sand when they become aware of information
outside of the scope of their representation, and siloing themselves to
only their areas of expertise. Burying their heads in the sand and siloing is
legal, and it is reinforced and encouraged by the outcome of over fifteen
years of § 307 and the changes to the Model Rules.
When legislators and administrators attempt to make attorneys
whistleblowers, and in some scenarios gatekeepers, they believe they are
operating under the assumption that it is a scenario that creates a pris-
oner’s dilemma that makes disclosure a clearer and easier choice. They
assume that an attorney faced with client wrongdoing is practicing in a
binary in which the choice is to either participate and face future punish-
ment with coconspirators or disclose client information to receive protec-
tion. But what they actually create for attorneys is a catch-22. A
prisoner’s dilemma with no upside is no dilemma at all. Attorneys are
128. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
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taking the action that makes the most sense economically and
professionally.
Clients prefer legal advice that allows them to accomplish their
goals.129 In a transactional setting where the role of the attorney is less
clear, clients want an attorney who will help them to avoid future liability
and who will help them achieve the goals they want, not an attorney who
will interrogate them or who will delay the transaction with investiga-
tion.130 In addition, due to long-standing corporate law principles, such as
the business judgment rule, simply seeking advice of an expert raises the
burden of proof in court, even if that advice is not implemented.131 Enron
utilized this device frequently. For example, Enron executives sought ad-
vice about conflicts of interest, and instead of avoiding the conflicts, they
restructured the transactions and concealed the conflicts when utilized.
The whistleblower regime has not changed this phenomenon.
III. THE IMPACT OF BUSINESS STRUCTURE
The foundation of § 307 is that federal intervention is necessary to rem-
edy the failure of state ethical codes to prevent attorney participation in
fraud on the market. This assumption is not based in the reality of corpo-
rate governance, and it may, in fact, contradict shareholder desires. If up-
the-chain reporting results in no change, it is improper to assume that it
means the board and management are colluding to minimize shareholder
value and commit fraud. The top of the chain could be acting with author-
ity from shareholders to innovate and even with authority to push the
envelope to make new law.132
At Enron, for example, shareholders and analysts were aware that the
company was taking an aggressive approach to accounting and utilizing
complex business structures. Investors believed that it was this innovation
that was responsible for the record growth of the company, so they con-
tinued to reward Enron with positive analyst ratings and record stock
price gains. These stakeholders were unaware of the fraud, but the exis-
tence of fraud does not automatically revoke the endorsement of disrup-
tion and innovation. Post-Enron, the market continues to reward
companies that push the envelope and continues to invest in companies
that are structurally complex.
This part analyzes corporate structure and governance, and its impacts
on the operation of the SEC Standards, the updated Model Rules, and
Dodd-Frank inspired changes to whistleblower rewards. This examination
illustrates why the attorney whistleblower is a myth through an analysis
of how Enron’s legal department operated and how it interfaced with the
129. Pollman, supra note 2, at 757–58.
130. See, e.g., ROSEN, supra note 28, at 15.
131. See Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Once More, the Business Judgment Rule, 2000 WIS. L.
REV. 573, 573–74 (2000); Daniel R. Fischel & Michael Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules
and the Derivative Suit in Corporate Law: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71 COR-
NELL L. REV. 261, 283–84 (1986).
132. See Pollman, supra note 2, at 755–56.
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business and outside counsel. To highlight the role of our business culture
and legally available business structures in Enron, WorldCom, and the
financial crisis of 2007–2008, this part explains the role of attorneys in the
face of corporate creativity, innovation, and fraud. By maintaining the
same corporate culture while invoking fear of attorney whistleblowing, a
scheme intended to improve conditions may have made actors more
criminally sophisticated while offering no real solutions to prevent corpo-
rate wrongdoing. The corporate governance problems may remain the
same or get worse in exchange for a damaged attorney-client relationship.
A. THE ENRON LAWYER PROBLEM
The SEC’s attempt to comply with a congressional mandate that con-
tradicts their traditional deference to state control of attorneys resulted in
a non-regulation regulation that confuses the requirements for practice
and has produced no measurable results to date. This outcome is not a
surprise given that the SEC Standards would not have impacted the be-
havior or outcomes for attorneys at Enron—the very constituency John
Edwards intended to address when proposing his last-minute amend-
ment. The attorneys retained by Enron were, in many respects, already
acting as gatekeepers. Market forces demanded that they bury their
heads in the sand and rely on structure to silo. The decision was protected
by the fundamentals of business law, which define each legal entity as a
separate person, and the Model Rules definitions of a client for conflicts,
confidentiality, and competence. The whistleblower regime does not ad-
dress the source of attorney capture—structure and the very nature of the
practice of law.
Enron’s legal department had a very traditional structure. Each estab-
lished business unit of Enron had its own legal department and Assistant
General Counsel (AGC), who reported to both the business unit leader
and the overall GC, James Derrick.133 The AGCs met with Derrick
weekly.134 Outside counsel reported to the GC and the AGCs who re-
tained them. Enron also retained outside counsel in a traditional way.
Vinson & Elkins (V&E) served as primary outside counsel and provided
advice on corporate governance, mergers and acquisitions, and tax, rely-
ing on their internal practice group and client-matter structure to prop-
erly segregate information when necessary.135 Andrews Kurth also served
as outside counsel, advising primarily on FAS 140 transactions.136 In its
role as primary outside counsel, V&E acted like an external legal depart-
133. Derrick was a V&E partner before becoming GC of Enron. See Appendix C to
Final Batson Report, supra note 40, at 16–20; see also Sung Hui Kim, The Banality of
Fraud: Re-Situating the Inside Counsel as Gatekeeper, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 983, 985–86
(2005).
134. Appendix C to Final Batson Report, supra note 40, at 18.
135. Id. at 21.
136. Id. at 24; see also Neal Newman, Enron and the Special Purpose Entities—Use or
Abuse?—The Real Problem—The Real Focus, 13 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 97, 118–20 (2007)
(explaining the FAS 140 deals).
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ment, possibly because of Derrick’s relationship with the firm as one of
its former partners. Notably, post-Enron, corporations rarely retain
outside counsel in this general way.
The rest of Enron’s business structure can best be described as fuzzy.137
Its experts and the markets viewed this fuzziness as innovation not
chaos.138 Enron celebrated and rewarded V&E financially for serving as
an external GC office, adopting the Enron culture, and handling any mat-
ter needed at any given moment.139 V&E celebrated and profited from
representing Enron in a general way without clearly defined clients or
roles.140 The firm would be retained by the GC or AGC of a particular
business unit but would then fall in line with the rest of Enron’s culture.
The same was true for Arthur Anderson in representation of accounting
matters.141
At Enron, attorneys were involved with two classes of misconduct:
(1) mis-categorization of entities and transactions and (2) assisting with
activities lacking a genuine business purpose.142 The Final Batson Report
organized the wrongdoing into six categories, four of which involved law-
yers: FAS 140 transactions, tax manipulation, noneconomic hedges, and
minority interest transactions.143 Although Enron maintained a complex
structure and kept information siloed, it primarily relied on its two
outside law firms to assist its in-house attorneys with these activities. This
reliance on a small number of firms that were jacks-of-all-trades, and es-
sentially an outside legal department, made it more likely that attorneys
could obtain the information necessary to report up the chain or even
externally. V&E was not strict about identifying clients, so it did not avail
itself of the head-in-the-sand aspect of the practice that is facilitated by
the client-matter system. The firm was, however, able to rely on the silo-
ing effect of subject matter expertise broken down by sections and
groups. No single attorney or even law firm was in every room.144 So,
even though the Final Batson Report delineates fraudulent activities that
the attorneys were involved in, the attorneys at outside firms were not
found to be in violation of preexisting ethical standards.145
Enron’s business structure allowed senior management to obtain ad-
vice from counsel—both accounting and legal—then easily work around
it by relying on the structural irregularities to evade the internal con-
137. See infra Parts III.B–C.
138. See Marianne M. Jennings, A Primer on Enron: Lessons from a Perfect Storm of
Financial Reporting, Corporate Governance and Ethical Culture Failures, 39 CAL. W. L.
REV. 163, 231 (2013); see also Pollman & Barry, supra note 6 (showing this celebration of
difference persists today).
139. See Appendix C to Final Batson Report, supra note 40, at 21–24.
140. Id.
141. See Final Batson Report, supra note 39, at 39.
142. Id. at 7–9.
143. Id. at 48–55.
144. See generally id. at 6–10.
145. Id. at 41 (making no definitive conclusions).
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trols.146 Senior management could manipulate the external experts using
many of the same techniques it used to obfuscate internal controls.147
Enron took a “move fast, break things”148 approach to business manage-
ment, allowing employees to collaborate across units, work in temporary
teams with little structure, and generally do whatever was necessary to
generate as much revenue as possible in the short term to produce posi-
tive public financial reports. Partial information and a moving-target bus-
iness structure, combined with financial incentives, made it difficult to dig
deeper and disadvantageous to do so. Enron and its champions called this
lack of structure innovative and creative. In reality, it was the breeding
ground for fraud. In a system of legal representation based upon the des-
ignation of clients and matters, Enron’s structure made both impossible
to pin down.149
Attorneys of every variety worked in an environment that did not lend
itself to competent legal representation, because they were not in every
room and could not get a clear picture of what they were giving advice
about when their clients actively chose to conceal information and to use
attorney advice to evade detection even longer. These attorneys took
their clients at their word and issued opinions anyway, without deeper
investigation or clear understanding of the accounting or business signifi-
cance of their actions.150 The representations of Enron’s employees and
management, combined with feedback from outside experts, created an
echo chamber with no individual party wanting to be the one to raise a
flag.151
The Sarbanes-inspired changes to the attorney-client relationship seek
to solve the problem of corporate fraud by allowing attorneys to provide
the market with more information about their clients’ actions before the
harm is significant. The information that led to Enron’s demise, however,
was found through a careful analysis of publicly available reports.152 For
accountants, regulators recognized that a change in the characterization
of the accountant-client relationship was necessary to provide the market
with more truthful reports. The solution for financial reporting was not
more inaccurate reporting but instead an improvement in the practice of
accounting to generate reliable reports. Yet, when turning to the lawyer
problem, regulators chose to maintain the existing system and instead de-
veloped the possibility of breaking privilege and confidentiality to pro-
146. Id. at 26, 81.
147. Id. at 26.
148. The original Facebook motto was “move fast and break things.” Facebook has
since decided to take a different approach. See Aaron Pressman & Adam Lashinsky, Data
Sheet—Why ‘Move Fast and Break Things’ Is Out, FORTUNE (Apr. 8, 2019), http://fortune
.com/2019/04/08/data-sheet-facebook-social-media-regulation/ [Permalink unavailable].
149. See ROSEN, supra note 28, at 26 (the lawyer’s job is to evaluate a particular mat-
ter); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018)
(highlighting the importance of delineating by matter).
150. See, e.g., Appendix C to Final Batson Report, supra note 40, at 179–83.
151. Id. (noting the possibility of the lawyers’ reliance on inside employees and outside
accountants).
152. See Smith & Emshwiller, supra note 51.
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vide the market with more information through a regulatory agency. This
change to legal reporting requirements was made by Congress and the
SEC without acknowledgment of the attorney’s role or the elements of
corporate crime and fraud. The ABA’s attempt at an incremental change
simply muddies the waters, rendering the whistleblower framework
ineffective.
There is value in ensuring that attorneys do not hide behind their role
and its privileges to act as coconspirators to corporate fraud. Ethical
codes have well-established mandates to act against this tendency, as does
the criminal justice system. Securities regulations also had a preexisting
gatekeeper requirement. Yet, this system failed to prevent the fraud on
the market by Enron, which happened with the aid of legal counsel at
nearly every step. Enron’s attorneys were not found to engage at a level
to make them criminally liable, and only civil malpractice claims carried
any weight. The level of engagement, or lack thereof, by V&E and An-
drews Kurth was uncomfortable and disturbing but not illegal or even
found to be unethical under the rules and regulations in existence at the
time.153 In the wake of the outrage at this result, Sarbanes attempted to
implement a scheme that created an attorney duty to the market—not
just a duty to the client. Yet, that duty is subordinate to the duty owed to
clients in nearly every circumstance. This deference to state ethical codes
and recognition of the traditional attorney-client and business entity
structures means that the SEC Standards and the Model Rules act merely
as a warning to attorneys and a signal to clients that the attorneys can
never be a coconspirator and may be legally required to be more loyal to
the market than the client.
If one disregards the realities of legal practice, there is promise in en-
hancing the preexisting crime-fraud and gatekeeping standards, allowing
attorneys to share information when they believe the client’s agents will
not or have not responded appropriately and that there will be harm to
the company, its shareholders, or the market. The realities of corporate
legal practice, both in-house and outside counsel, cannot and should not
be ignored. If Congress truly desires to prevent attorney participation in
corporate fraud, it should leave attorney governance to states. Creating a
mechanism for disclosure without a parallel change to the nature of the
attorney-client relationship does not create the intended prisoner’s di-
lemma-based incentives, it instead creates a catch-22 for attorneys stuck
between loyalty to their clients and a yet unenforced duty to the
market.154
The definition of the client and the nature of the legal business itself is
within near exclusive state domain. Congress, acting in a crisis, appeared
incapable of working with the nuanced attorney’s role in the same way
that states have over hundreds of years of development of ethical rules
and common law principles. Removing attorneys from Sarbanes would
153. See Final Batson Report, supra note 39, at 1–6.
154. See Part II.B.
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not leave an attorney governance vacuum because Sarbanes currently
fails to make material change to how attorneys practice in its current
state. Rather than attempting to revise the law in a way that is both effec-
tive and appropriately and constitutionally deferential to states, the
poorly developed change should be repealed. States are capable of strik-
ing a balance that discourages Enron attorney-like behavior without cre-
ating alternative negative incentives.
Enron was not the first time attorneys represented people engaged in a
criminal enterprise during the representation. It is a part of what attor-
neys do. What the ethical rules require is that an attorney not participate.
At Enron, although investigators found attorney behavior to be troub-
ling, under preexisting laws, only those who knowingly participated were
penalized. The whistleblower framework would not result in additional
measures taken against Enron’s attorneys, and its design fails to en-
courage attorneys to be more forthcoming with their clients’ information.
This is because Enron’s legal department operated under the head-in-the-
sand and siloed model for legal representation that persists today.
B. SEPARATE PEOPLE, SEPARATE REPRESENTATION
While attorneys can refrain from engaging in fraud and can encourage
best practices, an attorney is not armed with the level of information re-
quired or properly incentivized to act as a whistleblower. This is due to
the way attorneys practice law and the nature of relationships between
attorneys, corporate management, and corporate legal departments, as
defined by both the client’s structure and the client-matter system of rep-
resentation. The Model Rules on conflicts of interest, competence, and
billing lead attorneys to employ a narrowly tailored client-matter system
and to specialize in order to command the highest rates and avoid having
conflicts of interest shrink the pool of future clients.155 This client-matter
system is deployed in companies that are often multitiered and organized
into various entities that, by operation of law, are separate legal people
and separate clients.156 When business structure is added to corporate
culture and attorney-client relationship fundamentals, it can act as a tool
that can be manipulated by bad actors to conceal wrongdoing and evade
attorney reporting requirements.157 Thus, a system that relies on attorney
reporting does not resolve the problem. A better solution impacts culture
by reimagining how companies and special relationships of trust are
defined.
Before its downfall, Enron was a market darling.158 Touted as the fu-
ture of energy trading and marketing, Enron was rewarded for its innova-
tion and rapidly rising revenues.159 For five years straight, Enron was
155. See ROSEN, supra note 28, at 5, 18–21.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 19–21.
158. See Smith & Emshwiller, supra note 51.
159. Id.
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awarded most innovative company by Fortune.160 Only one analyst both-
ered to ask to see the business behind the curtain161 and quickly discov-
ered that there was no business.162 Ironically, the information that led to
Enron’s demise was hidden in plain sight, right in the financial statements
for anyone who dared to look beyond the record-breaking profits to read
the footnotes.163
Under Jeffrey Skilling’s leadership, Enron’s maintenance of a compli-
cated yet disorganized business structure helped it to evade detection.164
The company rewarded employees extensively for improving the bottom
line and encouraged them to do so without regard for business units or
internal controls.165 Employees formed groups outside of the business
structure to accomplish specific goals, and employee sponsored business
initiatives were not uncommon.166 In addition, management at all levels
competed for the performance-based bonuses.167 Managers poached em-
ployees from competing units, if they were high performers with little
documentation or accountability.168 Skilling’s Enron was a high risk, high
reward, no risk, no reward culture.169 A failure to make money in the
short-term would result in termination.170 Employees were encouraged to
give little thought to long-term goals, because thinking long-term could
result in an end to the employee’s relationship with Enron.171 The fungi-
ble business structure made it very easy and advantageous to evade inter-
nal controls. At Enron, many of the factors that encourage employees to
commit fraud existed: (1) incentives and pressures that incentivized fraud;
(2) opportunity to commit fraud through weakened internal controls; and
(3) a culture that enabled fraud.172
Skilling’s Enron played fast and loose with its financials, borrowing
money at a rate that could damage its credit ratings and chill investor
confidence. Skilling, in conjunction with Enron’s Chief Financial Officer
(CFO) Andrew Fastow, began manipulating business structures through
the use of Special Purpose Entities (SPEs) to reduce Enron’s hard assets
while increasing paper profits and to conceal its risky behavior.173 Fastow
simply transferred assets off of Enron’s balance sheets and into an SPE,
160. Jennings, supra note 138, at 169.
161. See Smith & Emshwiller, supra note 51.
162. Id.
163. Id.
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in exchange for ownership interest in the SPE.174 The SPE itself would
borrow from financial institutions to conduct business and purchase as-
sets, which kept the transactions off Enron’s financials. Enron also sold
assets to the SPE, often at a price above the asset’s value, which enabled
Enron to record more profits and park bad assets in the SPE to avoid
recording losses.175 This structure enabled Enron to increase the return
on assets and reduce its debt-to-total-assets ratio. This made Enron look
more profitable and stable in periodic financial reports, which in turn
made the company look more attractive to credit agencies and investors,
enabling Enron to obtain more access to capital.
Enron conducted business through thousands of these SPEs. Guide-
lines in existence at the time required that only 3% of a company be
owned by outside investors to avoid classification as a subsidiary that
should be reported on a company’s financials.176 Enron manipulated this
requirement, sometimes partnering with other companies to form SPEs
and other times simply granting ownership and management interest in
an SPE to an employee in their capacity as an individual.177 Enron’s SPEs
often took the form of a limited partnership, an entity that has a general
partner who serves as manager and limited partners who are investors
with limited liability.178 The Enron employee or outside entity received at
least 3% interest in the SPE and assumed the role of general partner, and
Enron assumed the role of limited partner.179 General partners were in-
centivized with Enron stock and management fees. Enron also granted
stock to the SPEs as the capital contribution, which in turn helped to
incentivize lenders to loan to the SPEs due to the increasing value of
Enron stock.
Fastow personally managed two of the most controversial limited part-
nerships, LJM Cayman LP and LJM2 Co-Investment LP (together, LJM
Partnerships), receiving over $30 million in management fees.180 The
board granted Fastow an exemption from Enron’s Code of Ethics, which
prohibited such conflicts of interest. In 1999, the LJM Partnerships were
created solely to serve as an outside equity investor—which created yet
another level of nesting and concealment. With Enron stock as its capital
contribution and with Enron guaranteeing the debts, the LJM Partner-
ships obtained funding of approximately $390 million from multiple in-
vestors, including Wachovia, J.P. Morgan Chase, Credit Suisse First
Boston, and Citigroup.181 Merrill Lynch also contributed $22 million.182
174. Id. at 118.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 104.
177. See id. at 114–16.
178. Id. at 113–14.
179. See id. at 115.
180. Id.
181. See William W. Bratton, Does Corporate Law Protect the Interests of Shareholders
and Other Stakeholders?: Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. REV.
1275, 1309 (2002).
182. Id. at 1310.
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Enron used the LJM Partnerships to manipulate billions of dollars and
enter into derivative contracts backed by even more Enron stock.183 En-
ron’s use of SPEs created an echo chamber of artificial value. SPEs were
used to improve the financial outlook of Enron, which increased the
stock price, incentivizing SPE financiers to take a bet on Enron’s future
stock performance based solely on the artificially created values.184
The legal treatment of the SPEs mirrored that of the accounting treat-
ment. The default rule is that businesses are treated as separate entities
and separate legal people responsible for their own liabilities without re-
gard for whether the owners are natural persons or other companies.185 A
parent corporation, sibling subsidiary, or other associated entity may only
be liable for the actions of a related company under the theory of enter-
prise liability, a form of piercing the corporate veil. Enterprise liability is
an equitable doctrine that has two relatively vague requirements: (1) that
there be such a unity of interest and ownership that the separate person-
alities of the corporation and the individual (or related corporation) no
longer exists and (2) that if the actions are treated as those of the corpo-
ration alone, an inequitable result will follow.186 If Enron’s SPEs met the
accounting standards for separate treatment, they would also meet the
corporate law standard. This is legally significant because each legal per-
son, natural or corporate, is viewed as an individual client for conflicts
purposes and sharing information across entities is only allowed with cli-
ent consent.187 Enron Corporation always had legal counsel, but the SPEs
often had no legal counsel at all. If the general partner was an individual
Enron employee, that person did not have representation separate from
what they may receive through Enron’s legal department. Enron’s attor-
neys advised against these conflicts of interest, but Fastow and Skilling
chose to either disregard the advice or structure entities and transactions
in a way that it was not clear the advice was ignored.
Notably, Enron’s use of SPEs was not, in and of itself, fraudulent or
illegal.188 Instead, the fraud occurred when Enron misrepresented its re-
lationship to the SPEs in financial statements or, in some cases, buried
the details in the footnotes that no one bothered to read.189 The board
did not investigate Fastow and Skilling’s representations that the entities
were independent, nor did they challenge the ownership of entities by
employees, including Fastow. Skilling and Fastow reported the self-deal-
ing relationships between Enron and its entities to the directors and
backed their conclusions with reports from accountants and attorneys
who rendered opinions with only the information they obtained from
183. See id. at 1311.
184. See id. at 1307.
185. See Chatman, supra note 84, at 861.
186. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing Veil Piercing, 26 IOWA J. CORP. L. 479,
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189. See Smith & Emshwiller, supra note 51.
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their respective silos. The fraud occurred when Skilling and Fastow told
only partial truths to the board and its experts, resulting in inaccurate
opinions and a lack of board action. Enron hedged with itself—like a
series of nesting dolls—but it only showed the public the financial out-
comes of Enron Corporation, the doll that concealed a complicated net-
work of businesses designed solely for the purpose of manipulating
financial statements and obtaining more capital from lenders and busi-
ness partners. The attorneys representing Enron were instrumental to the
scheme yet were not conspirators. Instead, they were given just enough
information to provide support for the scheme and were not incentivized
ethically or economically to question the reasoning for the structure.
Then and now, the practice of law does not lend itself to the represen-
tation of entities without defined structure or with structures that inten-
tionally evade corporate governance norms. Remedying this known
shortcoming of governance and the attorney-client relationship could be
a successful solution to the Enron attorney problem. Skilling, Fastow, and
others took advantage of the trust of the board and the market to be
“innovative” with the market’s blatant disregard of norms, making opti-
mal legal representation difficult. A clear identity of a client is at the
heart of legal representation, as are clearly defined matters.190 The exis-
tence of a conflict of interest is determined by the identity of the client
and the scope of representation.191 Similarly, to determine to whom con-
fidentiality and privilege belongs and what is in the scope of representa-
tion, such that it may be subject to work-product protection, an attorney
must designate a client and matter.192 Fuzziness in the identity of a client
or a matter makes compliance with conflicts and confidentiality rules
nearly impossible.
In reports analyzing the downfall of Enron, investigators criticized
V&E, Andrews Kurth, and others for disregarding proper structure. Ad-
hering to these protocols may not have stopped Skilling and Fastow, but
it would make it far more difficult to engage in the behavior using attor-
ney assistance. The lawyers who were not participants in the fraud had a
difficult time keeping track of the moving parts.193 Resolving the
problems created by structure, which are state-created vehicles, in con-
junction with state norms for attorney governance, requires a solution
that addresses the source of the fraud, not one that simply deputizes
those who may witness it.
C. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE VS. WHISTLEBLOWER STANDARD
Corporations are “creatures[s] of State law.”194 State business codes
190. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
191. Id. cmt. 2.
192. Id. cmt. 3.
193. See Appendix C to Final Batson Report, supra note 40, at 179, 187, 190.
194. Chatman, supra note 84, at 827.
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define the requirements for corporate formation and for governance.195
There are no legal requirements for board membership in the state stat-
utes, but market forces tend to impose requirements on corporations with
desires to cultivate outside investors or to go public to choose a board
that lends an air of legitimacy and expertise. The board manages the cor-
poration on behalf of the shareholders acting as a fiduciary and owes the
shareholders duties of loyalty, care, and good faith.196 The board must
ensure that information given to stockholders, the government, and the
public is accurate. This is accomplished through the institution of proper
internal controls, auditing, and legal compliance. Corporate officers are
hired by the board and handle the day-to-day operations of the
corporation.
Directors are tasked with exercising care and loyalty for the general
well-being of the entire corporation or to outsource when they cannot
provide adequate oversight.197 They must act in the best interest of the
corporation, not themselves; they must exercise the same due care in
management of the business that a reasonable person would exercise in
the management of their own affairs; and they must act without a corrupt
motive.198 Directors and officers can be liable in some circumstances for a
failure to act. When considering whether directors and officers are in
breach of these duties, courts defer to the business judgment of directors
and officers under a doctrine known as the business judgment rule.199
This rule presumes that directors and officers are motivated to act in the
best interest of the corporation and its shareholders.200 If management
has proper internal controls in place, acts in a disinterested manner, and
acts in good faith, a shareholder plaintiff must present evidence to over-
come the presumption.
In many ways, the up-the-chain reporting requirements and the op-
tional external reports change the attorney from a corporate agent into a
fiduciary with a higher duty of care to the corporation than that held by
directors and officers. Historically, attorneys owe the corporation fiduci-
ary duties as well, but that does not require the attorney to oversee the
well-being of the corporation itself.201 An attorney is retained or hired to
complete the matter or assigned tasks with loyalty, care, and utmost good
faith and fair dealing. Attorneys are bound by preexisting ethical norms
to operate with a heightened level of expertise and knowledge, but attor-
neys cannot shelter behind a business judgment rule that allows them to
consult with experts and disregard that expert advice for business rea-
195. Id.
196. See generally Kelli A. Alces, Debunking the Corporate Fiduciary Myth, 35 J. CORP.
L. 239 (2009) (recognizing that corporate law is based on the concept that boards of direc-
tors owe duties to the corporation and its stockholders).
197. See Davis, supra note 131, at 575–76; Fischel & Bradley, supra note 131, at 290–91.
198. See Davis, supra note 131, at 575–76; Fischel & Bradley, supra note 131, at 290–91.
199. See Davis, supra note 131, at 573; Fischel & Bradley, supra note 131.
200. See Davis, supra note 131, at 573; Fischel & Bradley, supra note 131.
201. See supra Part II.
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sons.202 Instead, attorneys must provide services that are competent
based on their own reasonable judgment.
Under the new regime, attorneys appearing and practicing before the
SEC who are subject to the SEC Standards “operate in a unique advisory
context focused on self-regulation” of the business.203 Attorneys are ex-
pected to
independently decid[e] whether their client’s conduct is unlawful, ad-
vis[e] the client about such determinations, and tak[e] action to pre-
vent harm to the organization itself by escalating knowledge of the
illegal conduct to executives and board members so that it may be
properly addressed, thereby mitigating overall damage to the
entity.204
This advisory role imposes business judgment duties on attorneys without
business judgment rule protection and places attorneys in a position to
challenge corporate actions in a way not previously sanctioned by state
law and not required of corporate management. The whistleblower provi-
sions require attorneys to do more than their job. Reporting up the chain
may often result in a request for information not in the attorney’s control
or possession.
The disconnect between attorney duties as proposed by the
whistleblower regime and director and officer duties is exacerbated by
the difficulty in proving the elements of even the simplest claims that may
be levied against corporate bad actors. Common law fraud forms the
foundation of many claims against directors and officers. The elements
include: (1) that a party make a materially false representation of fact;
(2) that the party have both knowledge of its falsity or ignorance of its
truth and intend that it should be actioned upon by the injured party in a
manner they reasonably contemplate; (3) that the injured party have ig-
norance of the falsity and rely on its truth; (4) that the injured party has a
right to rely on its truth; and (5) that the injured party is damaged and the
false statements are the proximate cause of that injury.205 A claim for
breach of fiduciary duties against a director or officer follows traditional
tort principles, requiring duty, breach, causation, and damages. The busi-
ness judgment rule alters the determination of a breach of duty. Director
and officer corporate liability is based on intention of actions and not
outcomes alone because acting otherwise would punish management for
activities that are only fully understood in hindsight. Corporate law does
not punish the typical ways businesses fail: non-criminal incompetence,
continuing to engage in an obsolete business, or the negative outcomes of
a free-market system. Even the law of agency discourages penalizing
202. See supra Part II.
203. Pacella, supra note 12, at 500.
204. Id.
205. See Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Mutiny by the Bounties? The Attempt to Reform
Wall Street by the New Whistleblower Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, 2012 BYU L.
REV. 73, 107 nn.235–37 (2012).
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agents for actions they take on the imperfect information that may lead
to a decision that does not produce the desired results.
Corporate fraud is not based on an absence of information or on obvi-
ous and easily discernible misconduct. Instead, the most successful acts of
fraud are based on small lies about things that are complex and difficult
to understand, in a culture that does not punish outcomes that are harm-
ful but intentional and cloaked in process.206 What is wrongful is the lie,
not the outcome of the actions that survive the business judgment rule.
The wrongful conduct is based on the falsity of representations, a con-
scious disregard for truth, and the intentions of the parties to harm. It is
difficult to discern the role of an attorney gatekeeper or whistleblower
when a client is not lying or when a client does not express the requisite
intent to harm.
In a climate where most corporate conduct is not questioned by courts
and not recoverable by shareholders, the whistleblower regime expects
an attorney to use their reasonable legal judgment to serve as an internal
regulator, instead of as an advocate. Commission of a corporate crime
and corporate fraud both have standards that are higher than a breach of
fiduciary duties. Disclosure alone changes the nature of actions under the
law of fiduciary duties, which is sheltered by the business judgment rule
and adequate internal control processes. So, what was once improper
self-dealing, and even questionable business and accounting practices, is
anesthetized if bad actors inform the board, the board puts systems in
place to address concerns and analyze actions, and the board’s decisions
are informed by those systems. The lies in such a system are always
wrong, but biased and misguided decisions are not. An attorney cannot
be expected to discern between the lie and the mistake.
Attorneys can play a role in eradicating corporate fraud and modeling
good governance but cannot be the only party within a company working
in the best long-term interests of investors and the market. The same is
true of all whistleblowers. Whistleblowing depends on employees, agents,
and experts having access to truthful information that is harmful to the
corporation and then having the courage to disclose to assuage the harm.
The incentive—for market reasons and self-preservation—is to conceal
and fix, rather than to disclose. Whistleblower bounties attempt to mini-
mize or eliminate the impact of these incentives.207 The whistleblower
regime is imposed, however, on a system that relies heavily on the rea-
sonable judgment of those in a position of trust and avoids punishing
them in all but the most egregious of situations for actions that are only
clearly improper with the benefit of hindsight. This is the spirit of the
business judgment rule and other corporate fiduciary standards that focus
206. See generally CARREYROU, supra note 32.
207. See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 120, at 240–41 (2009); Jisoo Kim, Comment, Confes-
sions of a Whistleblower: The Need to Reform the Whistleblower Provision of Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, 43 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 241, 256 (2009) [hereinafter Kim, Confessions of a
Whistleblower].
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on punishing a lack of process and truthfulness at the time of the action,
as opposed to the absolute truth that may be revealed later.
The proposed change to the way attorneys think about the attorney-
client relationship could help to eradicate corporate fraud, but the change
fails without a parallel change to business culture. In a culture that re-
wards companies that are innovative while generating consistent returns
for investors, an overly cautious attorney who flags marginal behavior is
either kept out of the loop, completely disregarded, or dismissed.208 A
whistleblower regime without a parallel governance and cultural change
encourages attorneys to avoid exposure to information that could lead to
a need to disclose to remain employed. The failure is compounded by the
ways that attorneys practice law, businesses are structured, and compa-
nies are governed. To eradicate corporate fraud, there must also be ad-
justments to business culture, so that managers do not maintain the belief
that, to be innovative and successful, they must get as close to the line as
possible without crossing it or they must focus their efforts on crossing
the line without getting caught instead of complying with the law.
IV. THE ATTORNEY WHISTLEBLOWER MYTH
Before the Enron-inspired whistleblower scheme was developed, the
Model Rules, Federal Rules of Evidence, and securities regulations all
incorporated exceptions that permitted attorneys to break privilege and
confidentiality or to withdraw from representation, if their services were
used to commit a crime or fraud, if they believed they could not continue
to represent the client without violating the ethical rules, or if they knew
the client would commit perjury or otherwise violate the law.209 Attor-
neys have always been explicitly prohibited from counseling clients to
commit a crime or fraud.210 These preexisting carve outs set a clear line
between zealous representation of the client and participation in a client’s
wrongdoing. The whistleblower scheme is intended to move that line to
allow attorney disclosure when an attorney is aware of client wrongdoing,
has taken the required steps to remedy the situation with the client, and
the client’s response is inadequate;211 or when the attorney is of the belief
that remedial steps are futile and disclosure is necessary to protect the
business or the market.212 The whistleblower scheme also provides a
means for penalizing attorney conduct that does amount to coconspirator
but amounts to a disregard of duty to the client, its shareholders, and the
market as a whole when an attorney fails to take action when they have
knowledge of harmful conduct through representation.213
208. Cf. Pollman, supra note 2, at 735.
209. See supra text accompanying notes 65–72.
210. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
211. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(1)–(3) (2019).
212. Id.; MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6.
213. See 17 C.F.R. § 205.6.
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Even in the face of this new regime, the most egregious corporate con-
duct in the years following Enron has happened without any attorney
discipline. This lack of discipline highlights the role of attorneys in the
representation of corporations and the nature of pure legal advice.214 It
also confirms that the very measures taken to stop attorney involvement
at Enron would not have accomplished this goal at Enron. This part first
explains the attorney whistleblower framework then confirms that little
has occurred regarding attorney participation in corporate wrongdoing
using Theranos and Tesla as examples. This part then analyzes the results
of over fifteen years of changes to the SEC Standards and the Model
Rules.
A. THE ATTORNEY WHISTLEBLOWER FRAMEWORK
Crafting legislation that maintains the attorney advocate and counselor
roles while allowing for gatekeeping and whistleblowing roles is difficult.
Lawyers may be present and may be one of the parties to decision mak-
ing without being a coconspirator in fraud.215 As a result, the solutions in
Sarbanes, which have significantly changed other aspects of corporate
governance, including accounting, have not had a similar outcome on at-
torneys.216 There have been numerous Sarbanes-inspired administrative,
civil, and criminal actions against other actors but zero against
attorneys.217
The realities of the practice of law make it a difficult subject for nation-
wide, “federal [ ] action, let alone mandates.”218 The SEC Standards at-
tempt to intervene as little as possible, yet still have impact. Attorney
discipline should be left in state hands, as states are better situated to
react quickly in the face of attorney misconduct. The SEC Standards, in
conjunction with the Model Rules, create confusion and conflict that has
yielded no results to date. A better solution is the repeal of the Sarbanes-
inspired standards, leaving attorney conduct in state hands. This is partic-
ularly true if the courts continue to view the attorney whistleblower as an
anathema—a producer of worthwhile information but too disrespectful of
attorney-client norms to be worthy of protection.219
The changes to the SEC Standards and the Model Rules delineate ex-
tensive procedures for both outside counsel and in-house attorneys to
serve as a stopgap for corporate misconduct. At nearly every step, how-
ever, there is a call for the attorney to rely on their own judgment to
decide whether it is appropriate to act.220 The Sarbanes-inspired changes
to the SEC Standards and the Model Rules require attorneys to: (1) ob-
214. See Ribstein, The Death of Big Law, supra note 74, at 757–60.
215. See ROSEN, supra note 28, at 47–50.
216. See id.
217. See generally CARREYROU, supra note 32. There have been no enforcements
against attorneys in any roles. See supra note 21.
218. Romano, supra note 9, at 1597.
219. See, e.g., Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767, 781–82 (2018).
220. See 17 C.F.R. § 205.3 (2019).
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tain information through representation; (2) make a judgment call on
whether it is evidence of a violation of law or harmful to shareholders or
the market as a whole, then report the information internally; (3) make
an intermediary set of judgment calls to determine whether the repre-
sentatives of the company took adequate steps to address the matter, and
if the attorney feels those efforts fell short, report further up the chain
internally; and (4) if the matter is still not appropriately handled, make a
final optional decision to report externally.221 A flaw of the whistleblower
regime includes its over-reliance on attorney judgment of elements in-
cluding reasonableness, materiality, harm, and even what constitutes evi-
dence of wrongdoing.222 It also includes several escape valves, including
disclosure to an internal Part 205 Committee, which enables an attorney
to comply enough to avoid discipline and also avoid being a disrupter at
their law firm or company.
The whistleblower regime would have little impact, if it only existed in
the SEC Standards. The SEC Standards do not apply to all attorneys rep-
resenting a publicly traded corporation. To be governed by the SEC Stan-
dards, an attorney must, on the behalf of a client who is an issuer of
securities, transact business with the SEC, communicate with the SEC,
represent the client at administrative proceedings or in connection with
the SEC, advise on or prepare documents that the attorney knows will be
filed with the SEC, or advise clients on what materials are required by the
SEC.223 The SEC Standards state that an attorney owes his duties to the
issuer as an organization and has a duty to report evidence of a material
violation by the issuer or any agent of the issuer to the GC, the CEO, or
both.224 It reminds the attorney that reporting internally does not reveal
client confidences or otherwise violate privilege.225
Through most stages of the SEC Standards, all information is ex-
changed within the company and there is no breach of confidentiality.
The risk to the attorney who reports is not an ethical violation but retalia-
tion through the termination of employment or discharge from represen-
tation.226 The only remedy an attorney who believes they have been
discharged for reporting evidence of a material violation has is to report
their belief to the company’s board or a committee.227 The whistleblower
protections and bounties only apply when an attorney qualifies as a
“whistleblower” under Sarbanes and Dodd-Frank, and all statutes require
external reporting as the initial stage of whistleblowing.228 This fact, in
conjunction with the unclear definitions found in the SEC Standards and
the Part 205 Committee loophole, make it difficult for an attorney to be
221. See id.; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2, 1.6, 1.13 (AM. BAR
ASS’N 2018).
222. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3.
223. Id. § 205.2(a)(1).
224. Id. § 205.2(a)–(b)(1).
225. Id.
226. See Pacella, supra note 12, at 502–03.
227. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b).
228. Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767, 780 (2018).
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motivated to initiate the first steps of the whistleblower regime and
equally difficult to find an attorney liable for failure to do so.
An attorney may break client confidentiality and privilege and report
to the SEC without the client’s consent, to the extent the attorney be-
lieves it is necessary to prevent the client from
committing a material violation that is likely to cause substantial in-
jury to the financial interest or property of the issuer or investors;
[or t]o prevent the issuer . . . from committing perjury, . . . or commit-
ting any act . . . that is likely to perpetrate a fraud upon the Commis-
sion; or . . . [t]o rectify the consequences of a material violation by
the issuer that caused, or may cause, substantial injury to the finan-
cial interest or property of the issuer or investors in furtherance of
which the attorney’s services were used.229
External reporting is optional, not mandatory like up-the-chain or
compliance committee reporting, and rests on reasonableness. It also has
an unusual approach for attorney-client representation in that it allows
retroactive action. Typically, exceptions to confidentiality and privilege
only apply to future, non-contemporaneous or prior actions. In addition,
the standard for external reporting is stronger than the material violation
required for up-the-chain reporting. Actions must cause substantial injury
to financial interests or be clearly false statements that could lead to per-
jury or fraud.230 There is no clear definition of what constitutes substan-
tial financial interest, nor is there guidance. Instead, an attorney is
expected to question the business judgment of its clients in a way that is
not required of other parties elsewhere in securities and corporate law.
Historically, the SEC Standards have always given deference to the
power of the states to regulate attorneys. This has remained true even in
the context of the Enron-inspired whistleblower regime. An attorney
practicing before the SEC in the representation of an issuer is subject to
two systems simultaneously: the rules governing lawyers in all jurisdic-
tions where they are admitted and the SEC Standards. Part 205 supple-
ments state bar rules and does not “limit the ability of any jurisdiction to
impose additional obligations,” so long as those additional obligations do
not contradict Part 205.231 When there is a conflict, Part 205 governs. Not
all jurisdictions have adopted the changes to Model Rules 1.6 or 1.13, so
those attorneys have the advantage of only complying with one change
that may result in liability.
The biggest flaw in the whistleblower regime is the conflict between
what is required under the Model Rules and what is required under the
SEC Standards. The different lines for external reporting, coupled with
access to whistleblower protection that is based on compliance with the
SEC Standards, create a scheme in which compliance with the SEC Stan-
dards may violate the Model Rules but may be the only means an attor-
229. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d)(2).
230. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
231. 17 C.F.R. § 205.1.
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ney has to protect their livelihood. It is no surprise that attorneys are not
reporting client misconduct in this system. It is also no surprise that there
have been no enforcements.
The new version of Rule 1.6 allows a lawyer to reveal information re-
lating to the representation of a client “to prevent the client from com-
mitting a crime or fraud that is reasonably certain to result in substantial
injury to the financial interests or property of another,” if the attorney’s
services are used to further the crime or fraud.232 Rule 1.6 also allows an
attorney to disclose information to “prevent, mitigate or rectify substan-
tial injury to [] financial interests.”233
The previous version of Rule 1.6 did not include any exceptions for
financial harm. Instead, an attorney could only reveal confidential infor-
mation to prevent a crime or fraud likely to result in death or bodily
harm. Notably, all exceptions to confidentiality are forward-looking, ex-
cept those related to financial interests. Rule 1.6(b)(3)’s allowance of dis-
closure “to prevent, mitigate or rectify” is unusual, as it is not found
elsewhere in the ethical rules or even in the Federal Rules of Evidence.234
For example, once a client has actually caused the death or bodily harm,
disclosure of the crime is a clear violation of the Model Rules, even if
disclosure would prevent the wrongful conviction of another or give com-
fort to the family members of victims. An attorney who chooses to dis-
close may be subject to discipline. This is no longer the case with harm to
the market or shareholders.
The Model Rules and the SEC Standards are similar but not the same.
They are consistent conceptually—there are actions that require the at-
torney to report up the chain, the client is the company not its constitu-
ents, and there is a threshold upon which more egregious behavior may
be reported externally. Up-the-chain reporting is virtually identical with
the Model Rules having fewer steps defining what “up the chain”
means.235 Where they differ is external reporting, which happens to be
what is required for attorneys to access bounties and whistleblower pro-
tection under the SEC Standards. The external reporting conflict coupled
with minimal protections and awards may be why there are no enforce-
ments and no evidence of external attorney reports.
Notably, while Sarbanes and the Model Rules deputize attorney
whistleblowers to report externally when there is likely to be substantial
harm to shareholders or the market,236 Dodd-Frank back tracks, elimi-
nating the ability for attorneys to claim bounties and protections in most
circumstances involving the traditional practice of law.237 Section 922 of
Dodd-Frank required the SEC to adopt rules to reward whistleblowers,
232. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(2).
233. Id.
234. See generally FED. R. EVID.; MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT.
235. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13.
236. The SEC Standards also allow for disclosure for perjury or fraud on the SEC. 17
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237. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h) (2010).
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which the SEC implemented in 2011.238 In most circumstances, the SEC
excludes attorneys from these rewards. In statements, the SEC explains
that they intend to “send a clear, important signal to attorneys, clients,
and others that there will be no prospect of financial benefit for submit-
ting information in violation of an attorney’s ethical obligations.”239 This
clarification for attorneys happens at a time when whistleblowing for
other parties is being promoted. The SEC whistleblower reward excludes
information if it was obtained through a privileged communication; in
connection with legal representation; because the person was an officer,
director, trustee, or partner or learned the information in connection with
the entity’s duty to report; if the person was an employee with a principal
duty involving compliance; or if they were retained for an investiga-
tion.240 Essentially, the reward excludes every role an attorney would
hold in representing an issuer before the SEC. The regulations state that
an attorney can disclose confidential client information and possibly be
eligible for an award, if it qualifies for an external disclosure under the
SEC Standards and the Model Rules. The law does not protect attorneys
unless they fit the limited circumstances for an external report. In states
that have not adopted the updated version of the Model Rules, there may
be no circumstances in which an attorney can make a qualifying external
report. The Supreme Court confirms this interpretation of Dodd-Frank
whistleblower requirements in Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers, hold-
ing that the very definition of whistleblower under Dodd-Frank requires
reporting to the SEC.241
The definitions provided by the SEC and the ABA are all circular and
provide little guidance, which, in turn, does not provide a clear path for
enforcement and discipline. They are also inconsistent. Under the SEC
Standards, a company can stop a whistleblower in their tracks by forming
a Part 205 Committee, enabling the company to avoid the risk that a re-
port by an attorney dissatisfied with the actions taken by management
will result in a report to the SEC or other external bodies.242 The commit-
tee’s existence, which stops the internal whistleblower from having
grounds to report externally, also thwarts the whistleblower’s ability to
avail themselves of remedies for retaliation.243 The Model Rules provide
a space for external reporting but also rely heavily on attorney judgment
and maintain the previous options of noisy withdrawal from representa-
tion of problematic clients.244 The Model Rules leave more in the hands
of attorneys and attorney judgment. Thus, while the SEC Standards and
238. Id. § 78u-6(b). The SEC must pay from 10%–30% of amounts collected. Id.
239. Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,315
(June 13, 2011) (codified as amended at 17 C.F.R. §§ 240, 249).
240. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F–4.
241. Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767, 777 (2018).
242. See 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(c)(2).
243. Digital Realty, 138 S. Ct. at 780 (holding that the anti-retaliation provision of the
Dodd-Frank Act does not extend to individuals who do not report a violation of the securi-
ties laws to the SEC).
244. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
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the Model Rules provide an extensive attorney whistleblower regime
with clear steps for an attorney to take to properly report internally and
externally without violating preexisting confidentiality and privilege
rules, they also create a system with new places for information on corpo-
rate wrongdoing to linger and a process by which attorneys can rely on
reasonable judgment to avoid reporting at all. The differing standards
create an ambiguity that can be manipulated.
In concert, the SEC Standards and the updated Model Rules create a
regulatory regime that makes attorney whistleblowing a possibility and
that requires attorneys to disrupt the internal culture of their clients
through reporting to higher-ups. The conflict between the requirements
for external reporting and the requirements to receive bounties shows
intent to deputize attorneys as internal regulators, forcing them to dis-
suade wrongful behavior and jeopardize their livelihood without the pro-
tections awarded to other employee whistleblowers.245 Although the SEC
alludes to the possibility that a scenario exists in which an attorney can
report externally and receive whistleblower protection and awards, so far,
courts have explicitly excluded attorneys from the awards in many juris-
dictions and found that attorneys do not meet the standards for protec-
tions in others.246 This exclusion from bounties and whistleblower
protections emphasizes the minimal impact of the Sarbanes changes.247 If
protection is for whistleblowers but state ethical and evidence laws can
exclude attorneys from the protective scheme, the SEC is acknowledging
in a roundabout way that the attorney whistleblower is not real. The
courts are telling us that the attorney whistleblower is impossible. Attor-
ney-client privilege and confidentiality are sacrosanct. Courts will not al-
low an attorney to profit from secrets, even when revealing them serves
the greater good, yet expect attorneys to maintain the integrity of the
system through gatekeeping and whistleblowing without redress. Without
incentives for the attorney whistleblower, the attorney gatekeeper role
fails. Regulators like the idea of attorneys in these roles but have done
nothing to facilitate them.
The whistleblower framework fails in part because the definition of this
new line for attorney disclosure of client misconduct is ambiguous and
the SEC Standards and the Model Rules are inconsistent. The new
whistleblower regime does not have a clear, bright-line definition of how
much attorney knowledge is enough to allow an attorney to disclose with-
out violating privilege and confidentiality, and it disregards the norms
that govern directors and officers.248 Nor is there a bright-line rule for
when internal escalation up the chain is required, and often, the attorney
must operate internally before ever considering external action.249 The
245. See supra notes 194–218 and accompanying text.
246. See id.
247. See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 120, at 240; Kim, Confessions of a Whistleblower,
supra note 207, at 249–50.
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discretionary nature of the legal practice makes it difficult to define a
clear line from protected client communications to information that may
be disclosed.250 Determining what disclosure is allowed beyond the previ-
ous, clearly defined crime-fraud exception is difficult without the benefits
of hindsight.251 This is because, when legislators designed the
whistleblower regime, they did so with the purpose of giving attorneys an
option to fill roles that contradict the very purposes of relying on legal
representation.252
Securities laws, including the SEC Standards, create a scheme that reg-
ulates financial rights where other laws fall short. When investment op-
portunities have a proximity to capital markets or when an activity gives
the public an expectation that it will fit within the bounds of the Securi-
ties Act, courts tend to apply the laws. When another regulatory regime
adequately addresses the harm, however, courts and regulators are hesi-
tant to extend the securities laws to incorporate the activities. In cases
that determine whether activities fall under the purview of the SEC,
courts have disregarded the label attached by promoters and managers
when the underlying activity appears to fit within the regime. The role of
attorneys at companies that fall within the securities regulatory regime
presents a unique hybrid scenario. When engaged in the practice of law,
attorney conduct is fully regulated by state bar associations, who deter-
mine qualifications, administer bar exams, and impose discipline. The at-
torney disciplinary regime does not, however, require attorneys to
assume the role of protecting the market from their clients’ fraudulent
behavior. Nor does it apply when attorneys are engaged in nonlegal rep-
resentation. Yet, the SEC continues to give deference to state law defini-
tions of the attorney-client relationship, including the definition of a
client and the corresponding privileges.253 When it comes to regulating
the activities of attorneys, even when drafting new regulations that gov-
ern attorney behavior, the SEC has held fast to the definitions found in
business law and state attorney ethics codes.254 The SEC’s desire to im-
pose the new role on attorneys while deferring to state law judgments on
attorney conduct, business structure, and corporate governance means
that it is impossible to successfully deploy the attorney whistleblower re-
gime. It conflicts with every aspect of state law that the SEC desires to
leave unchanged. The best solution is a repeal of Part 205 and the result-
ing SEC Standards.
The structure of the practice of law naturally leads to a breakdown in
reporting and, if attorneys are a true source of material information, de-
tection.255 The Sarbanes-inspired changes seek to require attorneys to
250. See 17 C.F.R. § 205.3; MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6, 1.13.
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share more information up the chain internally and, in extreme circum-
stances, report to the SEC, but an attorney cannot report what they do
not know.256 When representing a company under the Model Rules, an
attorney cannot bring issues to the attention of a GC or board that they
do not understand. Whistleblowing for other employees can be based on
a hunch because they do not have an overarching regime of privilege and
confidentiality that create a floor for external disclosure. But for attor-
neys engaged in the practice of law on behalf of a client, the triggers for
application of the new whistleblower regime are the very thing Enron’s
attorneys did not have: actual knowledge or reasonable belief.257 As a
result, the SEC Standards and the Model Rules solution resolves a non-
existent problem—attorneys participating in corporate fraud with actual
knowledge or reasonable belief—through an impossible solution—up-
the-chain reporting or external reporting upon obtaining material evi-
dence—resulting in an absence of disciplinary and enforcement actions
and confirming that the attorney whistleblower is mythical.
B. THE MYSTERY OF MODERN FRAUD
In a piece entitled Enron’s Open Secrets that has been viewed by some
as a partial defense of Enron, Malcolm Gladwell discusses the difference
between a mystery and a puzzle.258 Gladwell suggests that most corporate
frauds are mysteries—helped by legal business structures and corporate
governance norms.259 As a result, it is not that the information is not
available, it is that there is a lot of information that is siloed in structures
and it is difficult to analyze all the information to uncover the scheme. It
is difficult to distinguish a lie from the truth in a sea of facts. Puzzles are
different. If corporate fraud was a puzzle, parties would simply be elimi-
nating the pieces—for example, not filing periodic reports, tax returns, or
public records.260 We would know something is wrong because something
would be missing. In essence, modern corporate fraud involves simple lies
about complicated things. When these simple lies about complicated
things are combined with a culture that is light on enforcement and heavy
on rule breaking for innovation’s sake, it is difficult to determine what
behavior will be egregious enough to be actionable.
Because the whistleblower regime does not help solve the puzzle,
which is only assembled by making the necessary changes to governance
to minimize the concealment of material facts and moving away from a
culture that prioritizes the presence of short-term gains, it does little to
prevent corporate wrongdoing. Instead of addressing corporate fraud,
what the whistleblower regime does, in conjunction with other forces, is
256. See supra notes 9–20 and accompanying text.
257. See supra notes 98–105 and accompanying text.
258. See Malcolm Gladwell, Open Secrets: Enron, Intelligence, and the Perils of Too
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train companies on how to avoid regulation and manipulate the market
with or without the assistance of their attorneys. The Enron problem is
addressed by remaining private, continuing to rely on structural complex-
ity, and in extreme circumstances, avoiding legal counsel. For example, at
Theranos, when Elizabeth Holmes defrauded her investors, attorneys
were present at nearly every step.261 In fact, she often used attorneys to
intimidate her enemies, and attorneys served on her board.262 Attorneys
advanced nonviable defenses and failed to report known deception to the
full board. But the Theranos directors had an odd devotion to Holmes.
Even in the face of information on the failure of the product and of possi-
ble violations of Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulations, they
trusted Holmes’s representations over the evidence presented by
whistleblower employees.263 In turn, Theranos investors, and even high-
profile customers like Walgreens, relied on the reputations of those direc-
tors when choosing to invest.264 In the culture of Theranos, attorneys who
did not go with the flow were terminated and those who served Holmes
as she desired were promoted.
Theranos is the example that most closely resembles Enron. It is a cor-
porate scandal that involved attorneys at every stage but, even with the
existing whistleblower regime, no attorneys have been subjected to SEC
enforcement or disciplinary actions by state bar associations. Investors
and regulators have also failed to name Theranos attorneys in civil litiga-
tion or administrative action, even in the face of known violations of
FDA regulations and the eventual bankruptcy of Theranos. Holmes
sought to revolutionize the blood testing business through a new technol-
ogy that could run lab tests on just a drop of blood from a finger prick.265
The idea, though ambitious, is scientifically impossible, yet Holmes was
able to become a celebrity, receiving accolades for being the youngest
female CEO and self-made billionaire.266 Holmes obtained billions of
dollars of funding in over a decade of operations, including a major con-
tract with Walgreens, without any proof that the blood testing devices
actually worked or that the company had any contracts.267 Theranos
never developed a working device and instead shipped blood samples
back to its internal lab, running tests on equipment manufactured by its
competitors.
261. See CARREYROU, supra note 32, at 7. Henry Mosley, the first CFO of Theranos,
was fired for refusing to inflate financials and for bringing up concerns during meetings. Id.
at 8.
262. See id. at 133–35, 256–57, 271–72, 279 (profiling how Theranos’s attorneys, particu-
larly David Boies and his former partners, were used to intimidate Holmes’s opposition).
263. See, e.g., id. at 80–91.
264. See id.
265. See id. at 3–5, 16–17.
266. See, e.g., Youngest Richest Americans 2014: Elizabeth Holmes, FORBES, https://
www.forbes.com/pictures/emjl45kfml/elizabeth-holmes/#1f8b61a97af6 [https://perma.cc/
WBN7-8KS2] (last visited Nov. 2, 2019).
267. CARREYROU, supra note 32, at 80–91.
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Holmes solves the Enron attorney problem by not consulting attorneys
with the expertise to tell her no, siloing information within her company,
keeping in-house attorneys in the dark, and hiring attorneys to advance
defenses that were colorable, only if the attorneys lacked the information
she kept siloed and embargoed.268 Holmes also surrounded herself with
knowledgeable and reputable directors, and used their credibility to
shield the company’s failures and her fraudulent schemes.269 Holmes ar-
ranged the company with redundant teams, then had those teams com-
pete with each other to develop solutions faster or face being fired. There
was no room to question Holmes’s vision. She created a culture of com-
petition, paranoia, and self-doubt. Employees were not permitted to com-
municate with each other about their tasks; they also were advised to not
reveal the company name on social media sites like LinkedIn.270 Security
monitored the coming and goings of employees and tracked their com-
puters. Holmes claimed it was to protect trade secrets.271
Whistleblowers are responsible for the exposure of Theranos, but those
whistleblowers—who include Tyler Schultz, the grandson of former Sec-
retary of State George Schultz, an early supporter and director of Thera-
nos—do not include a single Theranos attorney.272 Instead of working to
ensure that Theranos complied with regulations and followed corporate
governance norms, its attorneys were deployed as a weapon against
naysayers. David Boies, who served on the board of directors, and his
former partner, who served as GC, invested in the company and de-
fended Holmes’s trade secret and other claims in court and elsewhere.
Holmes fired the first GC of Theranos, Michael Esquivel, after his at-
tempts to work within the company to investigate wrongdoing and inform
the directors of his concerns were ignored.273 Subsequent GCs were com-
pletely loyal to Holmes. An attorney, David Taylor, was the last executive
standing after regulators uncovered the scheme and forced the company
to reorganize. After federal prosecutors filed charges against Holmes and
her ex-boyfriend Ramesh “Sunny” Balwani, “alleging that they de-
frauded investors out of hundreds of millions of dollars and defrauded
doctors and patients” with inaccurate tests and false promises, Theranos
was forced to dissolve.274
The perceived difficulties in the pending case against Holmes of Thera-
nos exist because fraud is not found in every failure. Fraud is not outcome
determinative. Fraud is about the mental state of actors when they bring
about a downfall. The whistleblower and gatekeeper regimes, therefore,
268. Id. at 20.
269. See, e.g., id. at 4.
270. Id. 296–97.
271. Id.
272. See John Carreyrou, Blood-Testing Firm Theranos to Dissolve, WALL ST. J. (Sept.
5, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/blood-testing-firm-theranos-to-dissolve-1536115130
[https://perma.cc/RRQ7-3C3Z] [hereinafter Carreyrou, Blood-Testing Firm Theranos to
Dissolve].
273. See CARREYROU, supra note 32, at 50–51, 54.
274. Carreyrou, Blood-Testing Firm Theranos to Dissolve, supra note 272.
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do not require attorneys to simply supply management with information
regarding negative outcomes, they expect attorneys to read the minds and
make fact-based decisions regarding the intentions of the very people
who have retained them. The lack of regulatory action against the attor-
neys involved in these incidents may be proof that regulators and law
enforcement acknowledge both the absurdity of the premise of a gate-
keeper or whistleblower and the near impossibility of proving what an
attorney knew at any given time about the intentions of another person.
Tesla presents another tactic deployed by corporations to resolve the
Enron problem. Tesla is a market darling which, to date, has no evidence
of fraud, but it is openly engaging in questionable governance behavior.
At Tesla, Elon Musk has used the company to bail out his other business
ventures when they have faced financial difficulty, such as the merger of
SolarCity with Tesla.275 Musk forced this merger, despite expert accounts
that the acquisition was not in Tesla’s best interest and without any re-
gard for the conflicts of interest between himself and other board mem-
bers with SolarCity.276 Musk also treats Tesla as his alter ego, using his
personal Twitter account to report inaccurate information to the public,
resulting in fines and enforcement activity from the SEC.277 He has
tweeted about delisting Tesla and making it a private entity—a task that
is impossible under the terms of his tweet. He has also defied SEC orders,
continuing to use Twitter to communicate about Tesla.278 The behavior of
Musk at Tesla is illustrative of how the cult of personality, board complic-
ity, and shareholder acceptance make it impossible for attorney interven-
tion alone to effectuate change. Musk and Tesla are notable because the
failures in governance have resulted in regulatory action and shareholder
litigation. Yet, the market continues to reward Tesla with a vote of confi-
dence through its stock valuation. Tesla shareholders also continue to en-
dorse Musk’s leadership.279 To investors, the promise of Tesla is worth
the penalties that have resulted from Musk’s violations and the fallout of
questionable governance practices.280
Musk’s tweet storm, in which he expressed a desire to take the com-
pany private, is telling. In the tweet, he brags about the idea of a private
entity being able to operate with minimized regulatory oversight.281 He is
of the belief that going private solves everything. Musk operates at Tesla
the way he operates at partnerships and seeks to force the corporation
275. See generally In re Tesla Motors Stockholder Litig., No. 12711-VCS, 2018 WL
1560293, at *10 (Del. Ch. Mar. 28, 2018).
276. Id. at *19.
277. See Complaint at 1–2, SEC v. Musk, No. 1:18-cv-08865 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2018).
278. See United States Securities and Exchange Commission’s Motion and Memoran-
dum of Law in Support of an Order to Show Cause at 1–2, Musk, No. 1:18-cv-08865.
279. See, e.g., Alexandria Sage & Ross Kerber, Tesla Shareholders Approve CEO
Musk’s $2.6 Billion Compensation Plan, REUTERS (Mar. 21, 2018), https://www.reuters
.com/article/us-tesla-ceo/tesla-shareholders-approve-ceo-musks-2-6-billion-compensation-
plan-idUSKBN1GX0C0 [https://perma.cc/J6K6-CUFW].
280. See, e.g., id.
281. See Complaint, supra note 277, at 12.
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into the limited partnership structure. Musk desires for his complete
dominance in leadership to be acceptable and for investors to have lim-
ited influence over his decision making. He believes a structural change
will give him both the freedom and revenue he desires. Musk is not alone
in this belief, as many in the industry feel private operation is the solu-
tion.282 There seems to be a belief that innovation cannot be paired with
following the rules—and if parties are avoiding the rules, they are proba-
bly also avoiding the lawyers.
In 2016, Musk decided to use Tesla stock to bail out SolarCity, the fail-
ing venture in his three-business pyramid that includes Tesla and
SpaceX.283 Fully aware of the conflicts of interest that existed, Musk
structured the transaction by the book. He abstained from voting, ob-
tained separate legal and investment bank counsel, and formed an inde-
pendent committee to investigate pursuing the deal. After covering the
bases to avoid a breach of fiduciary duty, Musk then disregarded the ad-
vice of the experts, even though it instantly doubled Tesla’s debt, was
deemed to be overvalued by experts, and was not the best option for a
solar expansion.284 Through coercion of other board members, exploita-
tion of conflicts of interest, and mock procedure, Musk was able to secure
a majority of shareholder votes and the full support of the board.
At the transaction’s conclusion, Tesla owned what was billed by
Goldman Sachs as the worst solar investment on the market.285 Tesla
doubled its debt taking it from $3 billion to $6 billion, harming its posi-
tion with creditors.286 Shareholders, directors, and officers of SolarCity,
including Musk, his family, and friends, obtained a windfall and a com-
plete return on investment in SolarCity through the sale at a price that
exceeded the business valuation, avoided the consequences of a bank-
ruptcy, and allowed them to continue management of the new wholly
owned Tesla subsidiary. Though Musk’s influence over institutional inves-
tors, many of whom are invested in all three Musk enterprises, and his
control of his friends and supporters on the board, he was able to force
Tesla into a transaction that by all accounts did harm to the company,
because it collectively benefited his empire.
Tesla’s behavior has not, to date, triggered a corporate fraud scandal.
Musk’s behavior and the SolarCity transaction is not criminal or fraudu-
lent. They may not even equate to a civil breach of fiduciary duty, if a
court finds that the recusal, retention of experts, and other measures fail
to rise to a level of a breach of duty of loyalty, care, or good faith. His
Twitter activity violates SEC regulations but does not rise to the level of
282. See Zachary Karabell, The Case Against Elon Musk Will Chill Innovation, WIRED
(Sept. 29, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/the-case-against-elon-musk-will-chill-innova
tion [https://perma.cc/2YCM-WTYW].
283. In re Tesla Motors Stockholder Litig., No. 12711-VCS, 2018 WL 1560293, at *19
(Del. Ch. Mar. 28, 2018).
284. Karabell, supra note 282.
285. See In re Tesla, 2018 WL 1560293, at *7.
286. See id. at *11 n.186.
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securities fraud. Instead, it is evidence of a legal loophole for behavior
that is oppressive to shareholders, economically inefficient, and allows
corporate management to manipulate corporate assets for personal gain.
As far as we know, there has been no whistleblowing about Tesla or
Musk’s behavior. An attorney who wishes to remain employed in a cul-
ture like Tesla’s must stick to burying their head in the sand and only
doing work in the silos in which they are hired. An attorney cannot blow
the whistle on things they do not know, and they cannot have the legal
certainty required when Musk’s behavior fails to result in any material
legal consequences.
Perhaps the attorney whistleblower regime is not intended to result in
actions against attorneys and is instead meant to remind attorneys that
they must not ever knowingly participate in or facilitate corporate fraud.
Unfortunately, a warning shot can have consequences—mainly behav-
ioral and market changes—particularly if nothing about the overall cul-
ture is changed. What remains post-Enron, post-Sarbanes, and even post-
Dodd-Frank is a culture that: (1) continues to focus on positive quarterly
and annual reports that show constant growth; (2) ignores the culture that
the need for constant growth and positive report creates; and (3) leaves in
place a system that allows companies to manipulate structures and trans-
actions to get those results on paper without realizing any growth. These
actions are legal and not in violation of any laws–which means that the
attorney whistleblowing scheme is not triggered. A company can meet
accounting standards, comply with state corporate laws, and properly re-
port as required by the SEC and still commit fraud in plain sight using the
Enron model for corporate structure. This is because, while accountants
must now consider the real party at interest when making reports, audit
independently, and prioritize accounting principles and standards over
client relationships generally, corporate legal representation did not un-
dergo a similar cultural change.287 The chilling effect on the attorney-
client relationship is only worthwhile if it results in changes that are, at
the least, as beneficial as the damage it causes.
Depending on so many variables that rely on both human judgment
and courage is an inefficient way to make real change. Instead, to achieve
the results desired by the Enron-inspired changes to the role of attorneys,
there must be a shift in the culture of business accompanied by appropri-
ate changes to state definitions of entities and requirements for corporate
governance. The capital markets reward positive periodic reports,288 cor-
porate leaders who develop a cult of personality that obfuscates the real-
ity of return on investment, and leaders who are innovative and cutting
edge.289 Disclosure alone cannot work in the face of these incentives. No
287. See Susanna M. Kim, Dual Identities and Dueling Obligations: Preserving Indepen-
dence in Corporate Representation, 68 TENN. L. REV. 179, 182–85 (2001); Romano, supra
note 9, at 1528–29.
288. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 12, at 1–2.
289. See, e.g., CARREYROU, supra note 32, at 5 (describing venture capital culture of
inflating numbers; the “hockey-stick forecast”).
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intermediaries can stop a client who is set on committing fraud. Even the
savviest attorney can be fooled by deliberate lies. But if structures are not
in place that allow shielding attorneys from relevant information, then it
will be possible for them to meet the higher knowledge standard for at-
torney whistleblowing. Such a structural change will not, however, pre-
vent clients set on committing fraud from avoiding attorney advice
altogether.
C. THE MEANING OF ZERO
Misidentifying the real client at interest—the corporation—is one of
the long-standing agency costs of the corporate form. It is an issue with all
corporate agents and fiduciaries.290 When combined with the attorney-
client relationship, it creates a special mix ripe for collusion that can ulti-
mately hurt the corporation, its investors, and even the entire economy.
Before Sarbanes, state corporate laws and federal regulations provided
remedies aimed at minimizing these costs but largely left the attorney-
client relationship untouched.291 The SEC Standards and the Model
Rules attempt to harness the sacred nature of the attorney-client relation-
ship to head off-market crippling corruption before it is too late and to
give corporations an earlier chance to address employees who are not
working in the corporation’s best interest. To promote this social good,
the provisions include a hammer: attorneys found in violation of Sarbanes
may face fines and jail time, and an attorney violating the Model Rules
may face disciplinary action. However, in the sixteen years since Sarbanes
and the fifteen years since the amendment of the Model Rules, there
have been no enforcement or disciplinary actions against attorneys on
these grounds.292 In comparison, the SEC has pursued thousands of
Sarbanes-based actions against accountants and other corporate
agents.293 To date, more than fifteen years after implementation, there
have been no SEC enforcements for attorneys who have failed to comply
with the up-the-chain or external reporting requirements found in the
SEC Standards.294 There has also been no reported disciplinary action in
290. Agency costs are inherent in the corporate form because of the separation of own-
ership and control. See DOUGLAS M. BRANSON ET AL., BUSINESS ENTERPRISES: LEGAL
STRUCTURES, GOVERNANCE, AND POLICY 368 (3d ed. 2016). Corporations may only act
through directors, officers, employees, agents, and fiduciaries. Id. Economists and legal
scholars theorize that because none of the parties working on behalf of the corporation
“own” the corporation, they are not always incentivized to work in the corporation’s best
interest. Id. at 348. Good corporate governance is needed to eliminate shirking, self-deal-
ing, and fraud. See id. at 337, 347–48. Corporations attempt to instill a sense of ownership
through stock options and other incentives, shareholders may pursue legal action for egre-
gious violations, and regulations are designed to allow for the detection of governance
failures early and for the punishment of misconduct. See id. at 597–600.
291. See HAZEN, supra note 48, at 198–202.
292. See supra note 21.
293. See id.
294. Notably, there is a lack of pursuit of whistleblower claims for other employees as
well. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 12, at 105–06 (as of 2004, “of 223 cases filed under the
whistle-blower provisions of Sarbanes . . . all but 8 dropped,” meaning 96% of cases were
dropped).
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states that have adopted the current versions of Rules 1.6 and 1.13 and no
bounties awarded to attorneys for whistleblowing under the SEC Stan-
dards in conjunction with Dodd-Frank.
Although promising, the attorney whistleblower scheme seemed des-
tined for failure. The triggers turn on attorney judgment—a standard that
is difficult to impossible to judge in all but the most egregious attorney
judgment calls without the benefit of hindsight. In addition, it is possible
that the changes to the SEC Standards and the Model Rules are not nec-
essary at all. The evidence rules, ethical rules, and preexisting SEC regu-
lations all mandated and punished attorneys for conspiring with clients to
commit crime or fraud. While the whistleblower regime has failed to re-
sult in discipline, it could be impacting the way attorneys practice law, the
way clients retain legal services, and the way business is conducted.
The SEC Standards and the Model Rules provide avenues for avoiding
the scheme altogether. An attorney may comply by reporting to an inter-
nal compliance committee, by merely counseling the client to engage in
appropriate behavior, or by finding a colorable defense to the conduct.
Attorneys can avoid the scheme in more nefarious ways by simply avoid-
ing the acquisition of reasonable evidence—a feat that is possible under
the current system for handling clients and matters that is imposed on
businesses structured with multiple separate legal entities. If an attorney
specializes or is retained for a particular matter, they may justifiably silo
themselves to provide legally competent representation. If a client main-
tains a complicated web of entities and retains separate counsel for each,
an attorney has no duty to investigate the conduct at other entities within
the corporate family. And an attorney retained to represent generally has
no obligations to investigate beyond the scope of that representation, nor
does the attorney have an obligation to become an expert on nonlegal
matters. So, they may bury their head in the sand.
For these reasons, preventing corporate crime and fraud is not a feat
that can be accomplished by a company’s attorneys alone, particularly in
a market that can reward bad actors for concealing their conduct in the
short term. Although attorneys have been deputized as whistleblowers,
they notably have been excluded from whistleblower protections and
from enforcements and ethical discipline for failure to comply with the
Enron-inspired SEC Standards and Model Rules 1.6 and 1.13.295 The lack
of enforcement stems from the virtual impossibility of an attorney fulfil-
ling the whistleblower role while providing purely legal representation.296
The lack of enforcement against attorneys for failing to disclose miscon-
duct is also, in part, because the downfall of Enron and the financial crisis
295. See 17 C.F.R. § 205.3 (2019); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6, 1.13 (AM.
BAR ASS’N 2018). Attorneys who have blown the whistle were in-house attorneys, some
serving in quasi-legal or nonlegal roles. Those attorneys would have whistleblower protec-
tions and obligations pre-Sarbanes as employees, officers, or parties required to sign off on
periodic reports. This article is concerned with attorneys engaged in the traditional practice
of law.
296. See supra Part II.A.
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that inspired recent changes were not caused by a lack of information.
Instead, the source of fraud was false and misleading information, cou-
pled with manipulation of legal structures like special purpose entities,
subprime loans, and default swaps.297 Therefore, a solution that is only
focused on receiving more information fails.298 The regulations treat the
symptoms without curing the disease, leading to the failure of the pro-
posed attorney whistleblower regime.
The results of the Enron-inspired changes illustrate the difficulty, and
perhaps the lack of regulatory motivation, for implementing these
changes.299Attorneys have faced disciplinary action, been subjected to lit-
igation, and denied bounties for failing to follow the procedures properly
and for reporting externally to an improper source.300 The result of the
whistleblower regime is not disclosure but a series of chilling effects on
the attorney-client relationship, the attorney appetite for information,
and the desire to report.301 Following the development of the regime, in-
stead of the crackdown of corporate scandal through disclosures by newly
deputized attorneys, we have more examples of corporate wrongdoing
occurring in an attorney’s presence that does not invoke up-the-chain or
external reporting. The whistleblower regime creates a prisoner’s di-
lemma for attorneys representing corporations that has no upside—so,
instead, attorneys avoid the scenarios that trigger reporting. Attorneys
can rely on specialization, the definition of the client, and the client-mat-
ter system to silo and bury their head in the sand, avoiding information
outside of the scope of representation. At Theranos, attorneys did not
want to harm fundraising efforts and were swayed by the representations
of management that the product would work eventually. At Tesla, there
are no statements by the GC in the securities investigation file related to
Musk’s Twitter activity, and attorneys at Tesla deferred to the judgment
of external experts regarding the SolarCity merger. These decisions to
maintain the client confidences, defer to the judgment of management
and external attorneys, and even to keep the information at the level of
the company where the violations occurred, have been found to be within
the reasonable judgment of the attorney.302 Because the attorney role is
different and the very nature of this role makes the promise of an attor-
ney whistleblower fleeting, no court or administrative agency has found
attorneys to be liable for failure to report up the chain or externally.303
The goal of the whistleblower regime is to stop client crimes and frauds
that harm shareholders and the market. The best way to adhere to tradi-
tional confidentiality and privilege norms while complying with the new
whistleblower regime is to avoid information—a practice that is both det-
297. See supra Part III.B.
298. See, e.g., Gladwell, supra note 258; Romano, supra note 9.
299. See HAZEN, supra note 48, at 412.
300. See, e.g., Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767 (2018).
301. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 12, at 116–17; supra Part II.A.
302. See supra Part II.A.
303. See supra Part III.A.
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rimental to the attorney-client relationship and the prevention of corpo-
rate fraud. All are harmed by corporate clients who avoid the advice of
counsel. Thus, the chilling effect is that the concept of an attorney
whistleblower—even in the face of impossibility—has the potential to be
far more damaging than the silent attorney who is aware but not partici-
pating in the scheme. What we give up in exchange for the mere possibil-
ity that an attorney may be able to ring an alarm before it is too late is not
worth the information. Instead, it is better to encourage attorneys to en-
courage best practices, and it is better to encourage clients to seek to
comply with laws instead of rewarding them financially for avoiding the
law.
Sarbanes and Model Rule 1.13 provide a roadmap for how a company
can retain an attorney and keep them ignorant and blissful. Companies
can continue to manipulate business entities law to develop the same
structures used by Enron but now with instructions for how to evade de-
tection. Because up-the-chain and external reporting turn on attorney
knowledge and are framed in the context of clients and representative
matters,304 a company can insulate an attorney from all the information,
retain an attorney for a very limited purpose, or avoid hiring an attorney.
Companies may manipulate business codes to ensure subsidiaries are
truly separate, avoiding up-the-chain reporting. They may keep corrupt
entities private, avoiding all public company reporting. Lastly, they can
simply avoid either seeking legal advice altogether or seeking legal advice
from licensed attorneys practicing before the SEC. If these efforts all fail,
the Model Rules provide an additional catchall safety net. An attorney
may simply be hired to investigate, attaching the requirements of confi-
dentiality to all they uncover in their investigation.305 Attorneys and their
clients have a clear strategy for how to fix their malpractice problem,
without properly addressing the fraud on the market problem. As a re-
sult, attorney whistleblowers and, to an extent, gatekeepers do not exist.
V. CONCLUSION
Historically, privilege and confidentiality have been considered the cor-
nerstones of the legal profession. Open and honest communication is nec-
essary for attorneys to provide clients with the best advice, and clients are
less likely to be honest when there is a potential for their confidences to
be revealed or, worse, used against them. The practice of law and the
management of business are subjective. Attorneys cannot make the right
judgment calls on subjective matters without a complete understanding of
the facts. Any regulations that impede on the open exchange between
attorneys and clients, therefore, reduces the value of the attorney-client
relationship. If clients simply disclose less, change their structures to
avoid the black letter requirements of Sarbanes and the Model Rules, or
304. See supra Part II.B.
305. See supra Part II.B.
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avoid hiring attorneys all together, attorneys will not be exposed to the
conduct regulators hoped they might report to save the market. Perhaps
one or more of these scenarios is why there have been no opportunities
for attorney whistleblowing.
Modern corporate fraud and the resulting market failures involve sim-
ple deception about complicated things.306 This is because corporate
fraud in its modern permutation is not based on an absence of informa-
tion.307 The systems in place to address fraud are all based on mandatory
disclosure of information—either to insiders, so that they may make in-
formed decisions, or to regulators, so that they may protect the public.308
This over-reliance on information and disclosures results in a breakdown
in the measures aimed at thwarting fraud because it depends on a pro-
spective whistleblower having enough knowledge and understanding of
the business and the fraudulent scheme to make a reliable disclosure.309
As a result, what is successful about Sarbanes and Dodd-Frank is not the
encouragement of whistleblowing and voluntary disclosure but changes
to what regulators monitor and the means by which they monitor indus-
tries.310 This hard truth manifests in how changes to the whistleblowing
regime have provided the worst actors with a blueprint for defrauding the
market in plain sight. By simply siloing and embargoing information from
attorneys, management can continue a scheme without fear of an attor-
ney whistleblower. Without any upside to attorney whistleblowing, attor-
neys rely on the Model Rules to take advantage of the silos and bury
their heads in the sand, avoiding information that they may be required
to report.
The attorney role is in fact different than that held by other experts,
but the attorney is still a human being, subject to the same psychological
phenomena that impact all rationally thinking people. The higher duty
and special place in society does not strip attorneys of their human na-
ture. While complying with the rules imposed upon them by primarily
state bar associations, attorneys want to engage in enterprises that reward
them financially, garner the respect of their clients and colleagues, and
reflect the special role they hold in the justice system and American soci-
ety. The best way to maintain clients is to become, at least minimally,
captured by the client. Clients desire attorneys who are loyal to them,
believe in their goals, and actively protect their interests. To continue this
relationship in an environment that attempts to deputize an attorney as a
306. See supra Part II.B.
307. See, e.g., CARREYROU, supra note 32 (chronicling Elizabeth Holmes and the fail-
ure of Theranos); ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL (2009) (chronicling the 2008
financial crisis from the perspective of regulators and business leaders).
308. See 17 C.F.R. § 205.3 (2019); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6, 1.13 (AM.
BAR ASS’N 2018). A unicorn, like Theranos, avoids some degree of this oversight by mar-
ket regulators by remaining private. But remaining private does not stop industry specific
agencies like the FDA, the Environmental Protection Agency, or the National Transporta-
tion Safety Board from uncovering harmful behavior.
309. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 205.3.
310. See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, supra note 12, at 1–2.
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whistleblower, the best option is to operate in the silos of specialization
and avoid information that the attorney may be required to report.
It is difficult, if not impossible, to develop a system that fully encapsu-
lates the nuances of the attorney-client relationship while mandating that
attorneys violate that trust by disclosing information to protect third par-
ties and the capital markets. Attorneys are advocates for their clients, not
a secondary regulatory force. Blurring the lines and deputizing attorneys
as whistleblowers frustrates the purpose of the attorney-client relation-
ship. To provide accurate advice, it is necessary for attorneys to have all
material information at their disposal. Fear that an attorney will report
information to regulatory agencies will limit what clients share with their
lawyers, crippling an attorney’s ability to give accurate legal advice.
Sarbanes passed with the goal of reminding lawyers who the client is
after an era in which corporate management appeared to uninhibitedly
engage in fraud with the assistance of counsel.311 The SEC Standards
“emphasize that lawyers owe fiduciary duties to the organizations they
represent, including their investors and shareholders, rather than to the
[executives] whom attorneys may see the most regularly.”312 The SEC
Standards and the Model Rules “require lawyers to take steps to mitigate
overall damage to the organization by alerting key executives and the
board of directors to material violations of the law that the lawyer discov-
ers” in the course of representation.313 “Instead of focusing on the attor-
ney’s role as an advocate in an adversarial setting, [the whistleblower
regime] emphasizes the attorney’s role as an advisor” and gatekeeper
“focused on ensuring compliance with the law.”314
The statutes, rules, and regulations developed in response to Enron in
2002 and to the financial crisis in 2010 look backward and punish bad
actors and their conduct while doing little to effectuate cultural change.
The attorney whistleblower regime seeks to deputize attorneys to disclose
the misconduct at the point in time in which an attorney is aware and has
expressed concern but before such misconduct is discovered by regula-
tors.315 To justify breaking privilege and confidentiality, attorneys are ex-
pected to make a determination that what they know is significant
enough to cause harm to shareholders and the market—a test often not
met by regulators until months and even years of investigation.316 Often,
criminal, civil, and administrative investigations result in no action against
management at all or in the punishment of activities outside of the scope
of what would trigger attorney whistleblowing.317 If the attorney’s rea-
sonable judgment is incorrect and breaking privilege and confidentiality
311. See Pacella, supra note 12, at 498.
312. Id.
313. Id. (citing 148 CONG. REC. S6,524–60 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (statement of Sen.
Edwards)).
314. Id. at 499.
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is not justified, they may face discipline.318 If the attorney is correct, they
may face retaliation of which the only viable remedy is to report to the
highest level of the company the reason for termination, withdrawal, or
dismissal from representation.319 The requirements for recovery of a
whistleblower bounty under Dodd-Frank and for whistleblower protec-
tions found elsewhere make it difficult for an attorney to see any advan-
tage to reporting externally.
A flaw of the whistleblower regime includes its overreliance on attor-
ney judgment of elements including reasonableness, materiality, harm,
and even what constitutes evidence of wrongdoing.320 It also includes sev-
eral escape valves, which enables an attorney to comply enough to avoid
discipline, but avoid being a disrupter at their law firm or company.321
Although the attorney whistleblower does not exist, in a business culture
that champions innovation and profits, the risk of a whistleblowing attor-
ney could lead businesses to manipulate how they consume legal services
using the roadmap provided by the very regulations meant to stop the
next Enron. The lack of attorney discipline post-Enron, coupled with the
numerous examples of corporate wrongdoing following Enron, show that
while the companies have solved the Enron attorney problem, regulators
have not. Attorneys continue to advise clients engaged in corporate fraud
and continue to keep quiet about such conduct.
Even if attorneys possessed the information desired by regulators,
often, the problem is not a lack of information. Corporate scandals are
born out of ambiguity and complexity—an ambiguity that is encouraged
by a focus on positive periodic reports, payment of regular dividends, and
other surface indications of a company’s success. The line between good
governance aimed at profit maximization and criminal or fraudulent cor-
porate behavior is difficult to discern when the people who are typically
the most egregious bad actors are also the same people tasked with ag-
gressively using all the legal tools available to produce results. A com-
pany may legally paint itself in the best light by manipulating business
structures, tax laws, accounting rules, and other regulations with the assis-
tance of attorneys and other experts and may be deemed to be in breach
of their duties if they fail to do so. Management is rewarded for painting
the part of the story that the market sees quarterly and annually in the
best light with positive market reports, increased stock prices, and often
additional personal compensation.322 Management may face punishment
in the form of removal or actions for breach of fiduciary duties if they fail
to walk to the line without crossing it, making a company produce in a
way that is positively reflected in the public filing story.
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Bad actors are most successful, and cause the most harm, when they
mostly comply with regulations and appear, on the surface, to follow the
law, and business culture rewards management when they act in a similar
fashion. The line between bad actor and forward-thinking management is
blurry. Corporate scandals are born out of the fact that the information
that is the focus of a particular agency or class of investors does not tell
the entire story, and the culture of business does not reward optimal ethi-
cal and governance standards in the short term. Preventing crime or fraud
requires removing the incentives and the tools used to commit the crime
or fraud. A system that does not alter the culture cannot rely on the judg-
ment and disclosures of experts, such as attorneys, to mitigate fraud.
While the goal is to stop client crimes and frauds that hurt shareholders
and the market, the best way to adhere to traditional confidentiality and
privilege norms while complying with the new whistleblower regime is to
avoid information—a practice that is both detrimental to the attorney-
client relationship and the prevention of corporate fraud. All are harmed
by corporate clients who avoid the advice of counsel, and all are harmed
by attorneys who rely on practice norms that silo information to bury
their head in the sand and avoid learning material information. Thus, the
chilling effect that the concept of an attorney whistleblower—even in the
face of impossibility—has the potential to be far more damaging than the
silent attorney who is aware but not participating in the scheme. What we
give up in exchange for the mere possibility that an attorney may be able
to ring an alarm before it is too late is not worth the information. Instead,
it is better for attorneys to encourage best practices, and it is best when
clients seek to comply with law instead of using legal structures to evade
compliance.
Sarbanes and the Model Rules do not remedy the attorney conduct
that gave rise to Enron, and they do nothing to turn an attorney into a
whistleblower. Implementing a regime of attorney reporting does nothing
to promote the cultural change necessary to motivate attorneys to temper
their advocacy with investigation and questioning. In the absence of a
cultural change, many feel it does exactly the opposite, promoting a cul-
ture of narrower representation and ignorance, since an attorney cannot
question or report what they do not know. There are two major problems
with the up-the-chain, noisy withdrawal, external reporting structure: it
turns on attorney judgment, and it is based in a traditional corporate
structure. As a result of these flaws, there is plenty of room for the same
utilization of legal structures by business leaders who wish to manipulate
the market that Skilling, Fastow, and the management at Enron used to
make a run on the market for over five years. When combined with the
lack of protection for the attorney whistleblower, Sarbanes fails. These
changes only complicate the proper role of attorneys in preventing fraud.
Sarbanes, the Model Rules, and Dodd-Frank are a compliance scheme to
be evaded, not followed.
